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Introduction to the Study

In approaching the task of recommending how to structure a Directive on common minimum
standards for the recognition ofrefugee status in the Member States of the European Union, I have
struggled to avoid two extremes. On the one hand, my recommendations might simply have reflected a
search for the common denominator of relevant practice. The risk of this sort of analysis is, of course, that
it clearly promotes a "race to the bottom," in which those States which presently fully implement their
international obligations are encouraged to reduce the standard of protection. The alternative extreme
would have been to define ideal standards. This approach is also risky, in that any significant dissonance
between the common standard proposed and the reality of contemporary State practice might stymie the
political project of harmonizing interpretation of the refugee definition. In view of the system of shared
responsibility to protect refugees already in force among European Union states, failure to reach agreement
on a common standard for recognizing refugee status will result in unfairness to asylum seekers, and
potentially in unfounded refusals to recognize their entitlement to international protection.

I have therefore sought to stake out a middle ground defined by a search for what I view as "best
practice" on interpretation of the refugee definition. I have struggled to define potential rules which are
accepted in at least some, if not all, Member States; and which have a foundation in much, if not all,
leading official statements of refugee law doctrine. In devising proposed rules, I have to the greatest extent
possible retained concepts and language previously adopted by Member States in the 1996 Joint position
on the harmonized application of the definition of the term 'refugee. ' But my primary point of reference
is the duty to define Refugee Convention norms in line with prevailing international standards for treaty
interpretation. In particular, I have been guided by the exhortation of the British House of Lords in
Horvath (July 2000) that" ... [r]egard must be given to the purpose of the Convention and the object which
it seeks to serve. While the language of the article has to be respected, any preoccupation with the precise
words may fail to meet the broad intent of the Convention, and any detailed analysis of its component
elements may distract and divert attention from the essential purpose of what is sought to be achieved ... "

The Study is organized around the precise language of the Convention refugee definition. There
are eleven sections, comprising discussion of two general introductory concerns (general interpretive
principles and the nature of asylum), followed by nine subject-specific discussions. This approach reflects
the critical importance of anchoring analysis of the refugee definition firmly in the actual terms of the
refugee definition as codified in international law. Within each of the eleven substantive sections, the

analysis is divided between a proposed rule (shown the left column) and selective support for that proposed
rule (shown in the right column). Because this Study was required within weeks of its commission, the
sources cited in the right column are in no sense comprehensive, nor necessarily representative of dominant
practice or all doctrinal positions. They are intended to enable the reader to have some sense of the extent
to which the particular rules proposed are reflective of standards recognized in the jurisprudence of
Member States and/or in the primary standards of international refugee law. Reference to norms derived
other than from European Union or United Nations practice is exceptional, reflecting the commitment of the
Study to seeking out "best practice" from within the realm of the normative standards embraced by
Member States.

In preparing this Study, I have profited from the advice of a panel of experts convened by the
European Commission in Brussels in March 2001 to review a draft version of the Study: Jeans-Yves
earlier (Universite de Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium), Roger Errera (Conseil d'Etat, France), Antonio Fortin
(UNHCR, Brussels), Kay Hailbronner (Konstanz University, Germany), Gregor Noll (Lund University,
Sweden), and Stephen Sedley (Court of Appeal, United Kingdom). Several members of the staff of the
European Commission also made important contributions either by written comment or during the course
of the expert meeting, including Doede Ackers, Muriel Guin, Robert Jones, Richard Lewis, Didier Mouton,
Stefano Vincenzi and, in particular, Friso Roscam-Abbing. None of these contributors bears any
responsibility for errors or omissions in the Study, and none should be assumed to agree with all of its
recommendations.

A matter of particular interest to the experts who reviewed the draft Study was the level of detail
appropriate to a Directive on common minimum standards for the recognition of refugee status in the States
of the European Union. On the one hand, it was recognized that there is clearly a danger in seeking to
codify standards at the level of extreme detail. Not only may this make it difficult to reach agreement on
adoption of the norms, but it may inadvertently close the door to fruitful judicial interpretation of the kind
needed to keep the Convention refugee definition truly responsive to the predicaments which give rise to
contemporary involuntary migration.

Conversely, a skeletal Directive would also be problematic. Some courts in Member States have
expressed concern that responsibility sharing under the Dublin Convention cannot be reconciled to duties
under the Refugee Convention unless the normative and procedural standards in partner states are
genuinely harmonized. This is clearly right, as all Member States are bound independently to observe the

duty of non-refoulement, including the obligation to avoid the indirect return to the risk of persecution of
persons who are in fact Convention refugees. If the Directive adopted by the European Union fails to
codify a genuinely shared understanding on all fundamental elements of the refugee definition, it is likely
that legal challenges to responsibility sharing will continue and, as at present, will sometimes succeed.

In proposing the text of a draft Directive, I have tried to be mindful of the importance of avoiding
both excessive detail and insufficient precision. Annex I to this Study contains a draft Directive which I
believe strikes a fair balance between the two extremes; it is based directly on the rules stated in the left
column of the Study. In the event a more modest Directive is felt appropriate, however, an abbreviated
version is found in Annex II. If accompanied by a sufficiently detailed set of explanatory notes, I believe
that the adoption of a Directive along the lines of the text in Annex II would also be legally responsible,
though the process of harmonization among Member States would clearly proceed much more gradually
than if the Annex I approach were to be adopted.

My hope is that this Study will in at least a modest sense advance the goal embraced by Member
States in Tampere to institutionalize a "full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus
ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution ... " I am grateful to the European Commission for the
opportunity to contribute to this important initiative.

JCH
March 18, 2001
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Interpretation of the Definition of 'Refugee'
under Art. l(A)(2) of the
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
A Study Prepared for the European Commission
March 2001
By
Professor James C. Hathaway
1•· General interpretive principles

1.01 Member States affirm their commitment to
grant asylum to any person who meets the refugee
definition set by Art. I of the United Nations
Refugee Convention ( 1951 ), as extended by Art. I
of the Refugee Protocol (1967).

Refugee Convention, Art. 42(1): " ... (A]ny state may make reservations to articles of the
Convention other than to article[] l ..."
Refugee Protocol, Art. 1(2): "For the purposes of the present Protocol, the term
'refugee' shall ... mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as
if the words 'As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and ... ' and the words
' ... as a result of such events,' in article l(A)(2) were omitted."
EXCOM71 (1993): "The Executive Committee ... recognizes the advisability of
concluding agreements among States directly concerned, in consultation with UNHCR,
to provide for the protection of refugees through the adoption of common criteria ..."
TEC, Art. 63( 1)(c ): "The Council... shall... adopt... (1) measures on asylum, in
accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January
1967 relating to the status of refugees and other relevant treaties, within the following
areas: (c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third
countries as refugees, (d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting or withdrawing refugee status ... "
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1. General interpretive principles

EU 1996: "Whereas harmonized application of the criteria for determining refugee
status is essential for the harmonization of asylum policies in the Member States..."
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), Art. 18: "The right to asylum shall be
guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and
the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with
the Treaty establishing the European Community."
ILPA (2000), at Art.I: "The purpose of this Directive is to ensure that Member States
have a common approach to recognition of the right to asylum in the form of Geneva
Convention refugee status."
1.02 While the requirements of each element of the
refugee definition shall be satisfied before asylum
is granted, the elements of the refugee definition do
not stand alone. A decision on whether to
recognize or to deny refugee status shall be based
on a holistic assessment of the applicability of the
refugee definition to the claim.

Horvath, UK House of Lords, 6 July 2000.

1.03 Member States affirm their commitment to
the full and inclusive application of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol in accordance with
generally accepted standards of treaty
interpretation. The refugee definition shall be
interpreted in a positive and humanitarian way,
consistent with the objects and purposes of these
instruments.

The Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, 15-16 Oct. 1999, at
para. 13, committed the European Union to a "full and inclusive application of the
Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution."

ECRE (2000), at para. 14.

UNHCR (1995): " ... [A] positive and humanitarian approach should continue to be
taken by States in implementing the 1951 Convention definition ..."
UNHCR ( 1995): "The 1951 Convention is an international treaty in the sense of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and, as such, is to be interpreted in
good faith, and in light of its object and purpose."

-2-

11. General interpretive principles
EXCOM57 (1989): "The Executive Committee ... [s]tressed the need for a positive and
humanitarian approach to continue to be taken by States to implementation of the
provisions of the Convention and Protocol in a manner fully compatible with the object
and purposes of these instruments."
United Kingdom: Adan (House of Lords, 2000).
1.04 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall in
particular be informed by the human rights
obligations undertaken by Member States.

EXCOM84 (1997): "The Executive Committee ... [c ]alls upon States and relevant parties
to respect and observe rights and principles that are in accordance with international
human rights and humanitarian law and that are of particular relevance to international
refugee protection ..."
ECRE (2000), at para. 10.

1.05 The refugee definition shall be interpreted
without discrimination on grounds of nationality,
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief,
disability, age, sexual orientation, language,
political or other opinion, association with a
national minority, birth or other status.

ECHR, Art. 14.
TEC, Arts. 12-13.
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), Art. 21.
EXCOM15 (1979): "Decisions by States with regard to the granting of asylum shall be
made without discrimination as to race, religion, political opinion, nationality or country
of origin."
ILPA (2000), at Art. 7.

1.06 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall
take account of the specific circumstances of
women, children, adolescents, the elderly, and of
persons suffering from infirmity, whether mental or
physical.

EXCOM64 (1990): "The Executive Committee... [u]rges States ... to ensure that the
needs and resources of refugee women are fully understood and integrated, to the extent
possible, into their activities ... "
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1. General interpretive principles
EXCOM68 (1992): "The Executive Committee... [e]ncourages the High Commissioner
to ensure that specific attention to refugee women's issues becomes an integral part of
refugee protection ... "
EXCOM71 (1993): "The Executive Committee... [r]equests the High Commissioner,
given the diversity and persistent character of certain obstacles hampering the protection
of refugee women and refugee children ... to ... review options and propose concrete
measures to overcome them."
EXCOM84 (1997): "The Executive Committee... [c]alls upon States and relevant parties
to respect and observe rights and principles ... that are of particular relevance to
international refugee protection, especially to safeguarding child and adolescent
refugees, including ... the principle of the best interests of the child and the role of the
family as the fundamental group of society concerned with the protection and well-being
of children and adolescents ..."
EXCOM89 (2000): "Affirming the importance of according priority attention to the
protection needs of women, children, adolescents, and the elderly in the planning and
implementation of UNHCR programmes and State policies ..."
ECRE (2000), at para. 13.
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12.

The nature of asylum

2.01 The recognition of refugee status is a
declaratory act. A person is a refugee as soon as he
or she fulfils the criteria contained in the refugee
definition. This necessarily occurs prior to the time
at which refugee status is formally recognized.
2.02 Member States shall examine an application
for asylum made by any person under their
jurisdiction, subject to Community rules on the
responsibility for asylum adjudication and national
or Community rules defining the procedures
applicable to examining such an application.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 28.
ILPA (2000), Art. 5.

EXCOM68 (1992): "The Executive Committee ... [n]otes that effective and expeditious
status determination procedures and access to them should be maintained by States with
the advice and assistance of UNHCR. .. "
EXCOM7l (1993): "The Executive Committee... [r]eiterates the importance of
establishing and ensuring access consistent with the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol
for all asylum-seekers to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee
status in order to ensure that refugees and other persons eligible for protection under
international or national law are identified and granted protection ... "
EXCOM73 (1993): "The Executive Committee ... [c]alls upon States and UNHCR to
ensure the equal access of women and men to refugee status determination
procedures ..."

ILPA (2000), Art. 6(2).
2.03 Member States shall facilitate the duty of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to supervise the application of the
Refugee Convention and Protocol. UNHCR shall
in particular be granted meaningful access to all
procedures established for the examination of
claims to asylum.

Refugee Convention, Art. 35: "The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... in the exercise of its
functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of this
Convention."
EXCOM28 (1982): "The Executive Committee ... [n]oted with satisfaction the
participation of UNHCR in procedures for determining refugee status in a large number
of countries and recognized the value of UNHCR thus being given a meaningful role in
such protection."
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2. The nature of asylum
EXCOM52 ( 1988): "The Executive Committee... [u ]nderlined that States, which have
defined the protection role of the Office, have a responsibility to co-operate with it in the
fulfilment of its mandate ..."
EXCOM79 (1996): "The Executive Committee... [s]tresses the importance ofUNHCR's
being granted access to asylum applicants and refugees in order to enable the Office to
carry out its protection functions in an effective manner."
EXCOM87 (1999): "The Executive Committee... [r]eiterates that the institution of
asylum is of crucial importance to the international protection of refugees; [and]
re-emphasizes the importance of ensuring access to asylum procedures ... "
ECRE (2000), at para. 9.
2.04 The individual seeking recognition of refugee
status bears the burden of proof to establish prima
facie entitlement to refugee status. The burden of
proof to establish cessation of, or exclusion from,
refugee status lies with the State responsible to
decide the claim to asylum.

EU ( 1996), Art. 3: "It is for the asylum seeker to submit the evidence needed to assess
the veracity of the facts and circumstances put forward."
Germany re basic burden of proof: BverwG 9 C 12.88, 21 June 1988; BverwG 9 C
109.84, 16 April 1985 (cited in Henkel in IARLJ 1998, at 162).
ECRE (2000), at para. 74.

2.05 Notwithstanding formal attribution of the
burden of proof, the duty to ascertain and evaluate
all relevant facts is shared between the applicant
and the State responsible to decide the claim to
asylum.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 196: " ... [W]hile the burden of proof in principle rests on the
applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared between the
applicant and the examiner. Indeed, in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use all
the means at his disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of the
application."
Austria, VwGH, 26.01.1995, 94/19/0413, VwGH, 02.03.1995, 94/19/0576 (cited in
Carlier 1997, at 39); Denmark, RAB, 8 Oct. 1986, RAB, 9 Jan. 1987 (cited in Carlier
1997, at 321); Germany: 2 BvR 1416/96, 22 July 1996 (cited in Henkel in 1998 IARLJ,
at 156); Netherlands, ARR v. S, 13 Aug. 1991, RV 1991 (cited In Cartier 1997, at 508);
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2. The nature of asylum
Portugal, STA, 16 June 1983, ADSTA, 27 Feb. 1986 (cited in earlier 1997, at 545);
United Kingdom, Jeyakumaran, [ 1994] Imm. A.R. 45, at 4 7.
2.06 Each application for asylum shall be
examined on the basis of the facts and
circumstances put forward in each individual case
and taking account of the objective situation
prevailing in the country of origin.

EU (1996), Art. 2: "Each application for asylum is examined on the basis of the facts
and circumstances put forward in each individual case and taking account of the
objective situation prevailing in the country of origin."

2.07 In practice, it may be that a group of people
faces the risk of being persecuted for a Convention
reason. In such cases, too, applications shall be
examined individually, although in specific cases
this examination may be limited to determining
whether the individual is a member of the group in
question.

EU ( 1996), Art. 2: "In practice it may be that a whole group of people are exposed to
persecution. In such cases, too, applications will be examined individually, although in
specific cases this examination may be limited to determining whether the individual
belongs to the group in question."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 44.

2.08 A decision to suspend consideration of
individual asylum applications in the case of a
mass influx or to admit persons to temporary or
subsidiary protection under Community or national
law shall not adversely affect the refugee status of
a person who otherwise meets the requirements of
the refugee definition.

"Temporary protection does not prejudge recognition of refugee status under the Geneva
Convention": Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council
Directive on minimum standards for giving temporary protection, Doc. COM(2000) 303
final, at Art. 3( 1).

2.09 A person who is not a refugee may
nonetheless be entitled to protection on the basis of
other legal obligations, or to subsidiary protection
as defined by Community or national law.

EU ( 1996), Art. 1: "Determination of the status ofrefugee ... in no way affects the
conditions under which a Member State may, according to it domestic law, permit a
person to remain in its territory if his safety or physical integrity would be endangered if
he were to return to his country because of circumstances which are not covered by the
Geneva Convention but which constitute a reason for not returning him to his country of
origin."

ILPA (2000), Art. 4.
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3. " ... [l)s outside the counta of his nationalitv ... [or in the case of a stateless ~erson) of his former habitual residence..."
3.01 The claim to asylum of a person who is a
citizen of only one country shall be assessed on the
basis of the conditions which prevail in that
country.
3.02 The claim to asylum of a person who is a
citizen of more than one country shall be assessed
on the basis of the conditions which prevail in each
country of citizenship.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 87, 90.
ECRE (2000), para. 63.
UNHCR Handbook, para. 106.
ECRE (2000), para. 64.

3.03 For purposes of refugee status determination,
an individual is a citizen of a country only if he or
she is so recognized by that state at the time of
status determination, or if it is established that he or
she could immediately claim and receive the
country's citizenship without the interposition of
any administrative or other discretion.
3.04 Citizenship must be more than merely formal.
At a minimum, it must entitle the individual
concerned to enter and remain permanently in the
territory of the state of citizenship.

Civil and Political Covenant, Art. 12(4): "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country."
Van Duyn v. Home Office, ECJ (1975), affirming that it is a principle of international
law that" ... a State is precluded from refusing to its own nationals the right of entry or
residence."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 107.
ECRE (2000), para. 64.
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3. " ... [l]s outside the country of his nationalitt.. , (or in the case of a stateless nerson] of his former habitual residence... "
3.05 Statelessness does not entitle a person to
asylum. The claim to be a refugee made by a
person who is stateless shall be assessed on the
basis of the conditions which prevail in each
country where that person has previously resided.
A stateless person is a refugee only if he or she
satisfies the requirements of the refugee definition
in relation to at least one country of former habitual
residence and cannot return to any other country of
former habitual residence.
3.05(a) In practical terms, a stateless person can
have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in a
state of former residence only if he or she is able to
return to that country.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. I 02, I 04.
Thabet v. Canada, (1998) 160 DLR 4th 666 (FCA, Canada).
Compare ECRE (2000), para. 65.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 139.

3.05(b) A stateless person who is not a refugee may
nonetheless be entitled to protection in accordance
with the Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons (l 954).
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, 4. " ... [OJwine to well-founded fear..."
4.0 I The refugee definition is forward-looking.
The relevant question is whether the applicant's
fear of being persecuted in the country of origin (as
defined in Part 3) is objectively established.

Germany: BverwG 50.92 u.a., 26 Oct. 1993 (cited in Henkel in IARLJ 1998, at 158);
United Kingdom, Horvath, [1999] l lNLR 7 (H.L.); R. v. IATand another, 22 Oct. 1999
(CA): "Where objectively it is shown that there is a serious possibility of persecution
then it may well be difficult to refuse an application on the basis that the applicant does
not believe that the persecution will occur."
ILPA (2000), art. 10( 1).
ECRE (2000), at para. 19.

4.02 The fact that an individual has already been
subject to persecution or to direct threats of
persecution is a serious indication of the risk of
being persecuted, unless a radical and relevant
change of conditions has taken place since then in
the applicant's country of origin, or in his or her
relations with the country of origin.

EU ( 1996), Art. 3: "The fact that an individual has already been subject to persecution is
a serious indication of the risk of persecution, unless a radical change of conditions has
taken place since then in his country of origin or in his relations with his country of
origin."
Germany: BverwG 9 C376.94, 28 Sept. 1995; and BverwG 9 B 701.96, 4 Mar. 1998
(cited in Henkel in IARLJ 1998, at 159); United Kingdom, Dahmas, 17 Nov. 1999 (CA).
ECRE (2000), at para. 19.

4.03 The fact that an individual, prior to departure
from his or her country of origin, was not subject to
persecution or directly threatened with persecution
does not mean that he or she cannot in asylum
proceedings establish a well-founded fear of being
persecuted in the foreseeable future.

EU ( 1996), Art. 3: "The fact that an individual, prior to his departure from his country of
origin, was not subject to persecution or directly threatened with persecution does not
per se mean that he cannot in asylum proceedings claim a well-founded fear of
persecution."
Germany: BverwG 9 C 51.87, 16 July 1988 (cited in Henkel in IARLJ 1998, at 158);
Netherlands Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, "Harmonization
of Asylum Law in Western Europe" (1990), at 47-56; United Kingdom, Karanakaran,
25 Jan. 2000 (CA).

-10-

14. "... (O)wing to well-founded fear..."
4.04 An individual may be a refugee even though
he or she was able to leave the country of origin
without difficulty. Neither the ability to secure a
passport or exit permission nor departure without
hindrance is necessarily inconsistent with the
existence of a forward-looking well-founded fear of
being persecuted.
4.05 Because the refugee definition is concerned to
identify risks that would accrue upon the
applicant's return to his or her country of origin,
account shall be taken of any risk of being
persecuted identifiable at the moment of refugee
status determination, or that may emerge up to the
time ofremoval of an individual from a state's
territory.

Time of adjudication, not departure from country of origin, is key: Denmark, Report of
1983-1987, at 67 (cited in earlier 1997, at 308); Germany, BverwG (9 th senate), 20 Oct.
1992, 9 e 77.91 (cited in earlier 1997, at 245); Germany: BverW G 9 e21.92, 3 Nov.
1992 (cited in Henkel in IARLJ 1998, at 157); Italy, RAC Toscana, Dec. No. 199/94
(cited in earlier 1997, at 464); Spain, Audiencia nacional, 18 May 1990 (cited in earlier
1997, at 347).

4.06 The fear of being persecuted need not have
existed when the individual left his or her country
of origin. An individual who did not have a wellfounded fear of being persecuted at the time of
leaving may subsequently become a refugee sur
place. A well-founded fear of being persecuted
may be based on relevant changes in the situation
in his or her country of origin, or on his or her own
actions.

EU ( 1996), Art. 9: "The fear of persecution need not necessarily have existed at the time
of an asylum-seeker's departure from his country of origin. An individual who had no
reason to fear persecution on leaving his country of origin may subsequently become a
refugee 'sur place.' A well-founded fear of persecution may be based on the fact that
the situation in his country of origin has changed since his departure, with serious
consequences for him, or on his own actions."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 94.
ILPA (2000), art. 14.
ECRE (2000), at para. 39.
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4. " ... [O)wine to well-founded fear ... "
4.06(a) A sur place claim based on relevant
changes in the individual's country of origin since
departure shall be recognized only insofar as those
changes are shown to give rise to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted on the part of the
individual.
4.06(b) A sur place claim based on the individual's
activities since leaving his or her country of origin
is most readily established where the activities
relied upon constitute the expression and
continuation of convictions held in the country of
origin, and which are related to the grounds for
recognition ofrefugee status. Continuity of this
kind is not an absolute requirement, however, and
shall in particular not be insisted upon where the
individual's age, infirmity, or other circumstances
make the expectation of continuity unreasonable.
Nor is continuity required where the actions relied
upon are objectively regarded as the genuine
expression or consequence of one of the grounds
for recognition of refugee status.
If, however, it is clear that the activities since
leaving the country of origin were engaged in for
the purpose of creating the necessary conditions for
being admitted to asylum, the activities do not in
principle furnish grounds for the recognition of
refugee status. Activities of this kind may be the
basis for a grant of asylum only if they may
reasonably be expected to come to the notice of the
authorities of the individual's country of origin, be

EU ( 1996), Art. 9. I: "Political changes in the country of origin may justify fear of
persecution, but only if the asylum-seeker can demonstrate that as a result of those
changes he would personally have grounds to fear persecution if returned."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 95.
Compare EU ( 1996), Art. 9(2): "Refugee status may be granted if the activities which
gave rise to the asylum-seeker's fear of persecution constitute the expression and
continuation of convictions which he had held in his country of origin or can objectively
be regarded as the consequences of the asylum-related characteristics of the individual.
However, such continuity must not be a requirement where the person concerned was
not yet able to establish convictions because of age. On the other hand, if it is clear that
he expresses his convictions mainly for the purpose of creating the necessary conditions
for being admitted as a refugee, his activities cannot in principle furnish grounds for
admission as a refugee; this does not prejudice his right not to be returned to a country
where his life, physical integrity or freedom would be in danger."
EU (1996), Art. 7.4: "Holding political opinions different from those of the government
is not in itself a sufficient ground for securing refugee status; the applicant must show
that the authorities know about his political opinions or attribute them to him; those
opinions are not tolerated by the authorities; [and] given the situation in his country he
would be likely to be persecuted for holding such opinions."
EU ( 1996), Art. 9: "In any event the asylum-related characteristics of the individual
should be such that the authorities in the country of origin know or could come to know
of them before the individual's fear of persecution can be justified."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 96.
Re importance of continuity: Denmark (cited in Carli er 1997, at 311 ); Germany,
Nachfluchtgrund (cited in earlier 1997, at 252); Netherlands, AAR v. S., 26 Oct. 1990
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treated by them as demonstrative of an adverse
political or other protected opinion or
characteristic, and give rise to a well-founded fear
of being persecuted.

and AAR v. S., 11 Nov. 1982 ( cited in Cartier 1997, at 495).
But continuity requirements should not be applied in an absolutist way, particularly
where government in country of origin is in fact aware of activities: Belgium, V.B.C., 12
Oct. 1992, C.P.R., 13 Sept. 1990 (cited in earlier 1997, at 71); Germany, BverwG 9 C
143.90 (1992), 2 BvR 1587/90 (1992), 2 BvR 749/89 (1990); United Kingdom, Yavari,
[1987] Imm. A.R. 138, at 141 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 581.
No implied good faith requirement: United Kingdom, Danian v. SSHD, 28 Oct. 1999.
But France, Akkus, Conseil d'Etat Dec. No. 187530, 20 Oct. 1999.

4.07 A fear of being persecuted is well-founded
even if there is not a clear probability that the
individual will be persecuted. On the other hand,
the mere chance or remote possibility of being
persecuted is an insufficient basis for the
recognition of refugee status. The relevant inquiry
is whether there is a significant risk that the
individual may be persecuted.

The precise test is variously stated in the jurisprudence of state parties: "reasonable
likelihood" (Spain, Portugal); "reasonable degree of likelihood" (United Kingdom);
"considerable likelihood" or "cannot be excluded with certainty" (Germany); "strong
probability" or "not without foundation" (Switzerland); "sufficiently probable" (France);
"reasonable possibility" (United States); "serious possibility" (Canada); "real chance"
(Australia): Cartier (I 997), at 696.

4.07(a) In keeping with the commitment to a
holistic interpretation of the refugee definition, a
more generous approach to application of the
significant risk standard is called for where the
persecution threatened is particularly grave, for
example a threat to life or physical security.
4.08 All material evidence, whatever its weight,
shall be taken into account in reaching a decision as
to whether or not an asylum seeker has a wellfounded fear of being persecuted.

United Kingdom: Karanakaran, 25 Jan. 2000 (CA).
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4.09 In many cases, the primary evidence adduced
by the applicant for asylum will be his or her own
testimony. A determination that an applicant's
testimony is not credible shall be based on specific,
cogent concerns about the veracity of testimony
offered on a material point. In the case of
uncertainty, the applicant shall be given the benefit
of the doubt.

EU ( 1996), Art. 3: "It is for the asylum seeker to submit the evidence needed to assess
the veracity of the facts and circumstances put forward. It should be understood that
once the credibility of the asylum seeker's statements has been sufficiently established ...
the asylum seeker should, unless there are good reasons to the contrary, be given the
benefit of the doubt."
UNHCR ( 1995), at para. 10: "While the applicant must furnish the relevant facts of his
or her case, the very nature of circumstances which lead to flight from persecution is
such that the requirements of evidence should not be too strictly applied. While the
burden of proof remains with the applicant, UNHCR calls upon States to apply
generously the principle of the benefit of the doubt when the applicant's general
credibility has been established."
ECRE (2000), paras. 12, 17.

4.09(a) Reasonable efforts shall be made to
corroborate the applicant's testimony. Once the
credibility of the testimony on material points is
established, however, it will not be necessary to
seek detailed confirmation of the facts put forward.

EU (1996), Art. 3: "It should be understood that once the credibility of the asylum
seeker's statements has been sufficiently established, it will not be necessary to seek
detailed confirmation of the facts put forward ..."

4.09(b) Children and mentally disabled persons
may have different ways of communicating their
concerns and different knowledge of their
predicament than is reasonable to expect of a
mentally able adult. A generous margin of
appreciation shall therefore be applied to
assessment of the credibility of their testimony.
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4.09(c) Where an applicant testifies through an
interpreter, efforts shall be made to select qualified
and neutral interpreters, to ask questions which are
neither vague nor ambiguous, and to ensure the
accuracy of an interpreted answer which is unclear
or inconsistent with other material evidence.
4.09(d) The credibility of an applicant shall not be
called into question solely on the grounds of his or
her illegal entry or use false travel documents, so
long as a reasonable explanation is provided for
such actions.

By analogy to Refugee Convention, Art. 31 ( 1).
Belgium, Bennai, Conseil d'Etat Dec. No. 39.015 (1992); Netherlands Advisory
Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, "Harmonization of Asylum Law in
Western Europe" (1990), at 47-56.

4.09(e) The testimony of an applicant may be
credible even though it is similar to that given by
other applicants for asylum. An applicant shall not
be suspected of fabricating his or her claim simply
because it is similar to those made by other
persons, so long as the applicant is able to provide
a detailed account of the elements of his or her
personal experience relevant to determination of
the asylum claim.
4.09(t) The testimony of an applicant may be
credible even though it is different from that given
by other applicants for asylum from the same
country or with a similar background.
4.09(g) Inconsistency, misrepresentation, or
concealment by the applicant on a point material to
the claim to refugee status shall ordinarily lead to a
finding that his or her testimony is not credible.
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4.10 Where the applicant's testimony is found not
to be credible on a material point, asylum shall
nonetheless be granted if there is credible evidence
of another kind which establishes entitlement to
refugee status.
4.11 The risk of being persecuted need not be in
any sense unique to the applicant for asylum.
Asylum may be granted where it is established by
reference to credible human rights reports or the
credible testimony of other persons that a relevant
group in the country of origin faces a significant
risk of being persecuted, and that the applicant is a
member of that group.

EU (1996), Art. 2: "In practice it may be that a whole group of people are exposed to
persecution. In such cases, too, applications will be examined individually, although in
specific cases this examination may be limited to determining whether the individual
belongs to the group in question."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 43.
Denmark, RAB, 11 Dec. 1990, RAB, 15 Aug. 1991, RAB, 1 Aug. 1991, RAB, 2 Dec. 1993
(cited in Cartier 1997, at 328); Germany, 2 BvR 902/85, 515/89, 1827/89 (1991);
Netherlands, ARR v. S, 24 Nov. 1983, RV, 1983 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 514); Portugal,
STA, 24 May 1998, ADR, 20 Jan. 1994, STA, 23 June 1993, STA, 17 May 1984 ( cited in
Cartier 1997, at 553); Spain, Tribunal supremo, 6 May 1988, Tribunal supremo, 28 Feb.
1989 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 366); United Kingdom, R. v. SSHD, ex parte S.J., Q.B.
Dec. No. CO/290/84.
ECRE (2000), at para. 18.

4.12 An application for asylum may also be based
on credible evidence that laws or regulations in
force in the country of origin authorize or condone
the persecution of the applicant as an individual, or
of a relevant group of which the applicant is shown
to be a member. Asylum may be granted in such
cases where the existence and purport of the laws
or regulations are credibly established, and it is
determined that there is a significant risk of their

Systemic policy of persecution suffices: Austria, VwGH, 16.06.1994, 94/19/0295 ( cited
in Cartier 1997, at 47); Belgium, CPR, 20 Aug. 1992 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 99);
Germany: BverwG 9 C 158.94, 5 May 1994 (cited in Henkel in 1998 IARLJ, at 163), 2
BvR, cases 1300/89, 1986/89, 202/89 and 2021/89 (cited in Errera in 1997 IARLJ at 63);
United Kingdom, Jain, 6 Oct. 1999 (CA). Compare France, Mubashar, CRR decision of
21 Mar. 1986 (cited in Errera in 1997 IARLJ, at 64).
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application in practice
4.13 The well-founded nature of a fear of being
persecuted is not compromised solely by the failure
of the applicant first to seek protection from
another State, or because the claim to asylum was
not made at the earliest possible opportunity.

EXCOM 15 ( 1979): "Regard should be had to the concept that asylum should not be
refused solely on the ground that it could be sought from another State. Where,
however, it appears that a person, before requesting asylum, already has a connexion or
close links with another State, he may if it appears fair and reasonable be called upon
first to request asylum from that State."
United Kingdom: R. v. SSHD, ex parte Adimi et al, H.C. Dec. No. C0/2533/98, July 29,
1999.
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5.01 Persecution is the sustained or systemic
deprivation of State protection against the risk of
serious and unjustified infliction of harm.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 4: "The term 'persecution' as used in this document is taken
from Article l(A) of the Geneva Convention. The term is not defined in the Convention.
Nor is a universally accepted definition to be found either in the conclusions of the
UNHCR Executive Committee or in legal literature on the subject. The guidelines in
this document do not constitute a definition. However, it is generally agreed that, in
order to constitute 'persecution' within the meaning of Article l(A), acts suffered or
feared must: be sufficiently serious, by their nature or repetition ... [and] be based on one
of the grounds mentioned in Article l(A) ... "
EU (1996), Art. 5.1. l(c): "Any administrative measure taken against an individual,
leaving aside any consideration of general interest... on one of the grounds mentioned in
Article l(A), which is sufficiently severe ... may be regarded as persecution, in particular
where it is intentional, systematic and lasting."
France, Esshak Dankha, Conseil d'Etat Decision No. 42.074, May 27, 1983; Netherlands
Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, "Harmonization of Asylum
Law in Western Europe" (1990), at 72; United Kingdom: Horvath, 6 July 2000 (HL),
Shah and Islam, 25 May 1999 (HL ).
MIMA v. Khawar, [2000] FCA I 130 (Aust. Full. Fed. Ct.):" ... [P]ersecutory conduct
would be the state's systemic failure to protect..."

ECRE (2000), at paras. 20, 23, 26-27.
5.02 A deprivation of State protection is most
clearly evident where the threat of serious and
unjustified harm emanates from the State itself, or
from parties or organizations controlling the State.
This includes threats made by agents of the
national government, or by the agents of regional,
local, or other public authorities to which the

EU ( 1996), Art. 5. I: "Persecution is generally the act of a State organ (central State or
federal States, regional and local authorities) whatever its status in international law, or
of parties or organizations controlling the state."
EU (1996), Art. 5.1.1: "In all the cases referred to above [legal, administrative, and
police measures], consideration must be given to whether there is an effective remedy or
remedies which would put an end to the situation of abuse. As a general rule,
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national government is unable or unwilling
effectively to respond.

persecution will be indicated by the fact that no redress exists or, if there are means of
redress, that the individuals concerned are deprived of the opportunity of having access
to them or by the fact that the decisions of the competent authority are not impartial... or
have no effect."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 65.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 5: "It is generally accepted by States and reflected in State
practice that a refugee claim under Article I of the 1951 Convention can be established
if the State is the agent of persecution. This is equally the case when persons are
exposed to persecution by non-governmental entities which have some link with the
State, or whose activities are encouraged or tolerated by the State."
ECRE (2000), at paras. 21-22.
ILPA (2000), at Arts. 10(7), l l(l)(a)-(b).

5.03 There is also a deprivation of State protection
where the national government is unable or
unwilling effectively to respond to threats of
serious and unjustified harm which emanate from
non-state actors. In such cases, however, an
applicant for asylum shall demonstrate that he or
she has made all reasonable efforts to secure the
protection of the national government, or that such
efforts would be manifestly unlikely to succeed.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 5.2: "Persecution by third parties will be considered to fall
within the scope of the Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the grounds in
Article l(A), is individual in nature and is encouraged or permitted by the authorities.
Where the official authorities fail to act, such persecution should give rise to individual
examination of each application for refugee status, in accordance with national judicial
practice, in the light in particular of whether or not the failure to act was deliberate ..."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 65.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 5: " ... [P]ersecution may also emanate from entities for which
no link with the State can be established and which the State is unable to control. The
essential issue in establishing the basis and justification for the extension of international
protection is the fact of an absence of national protection against persecution, whether or
not this deficiency can be attributed to an affirmative intention to harm on the part of the
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State. Persecution that does not involve State complicity is still, nonetheless,
persecution. In such cases, it must be concluded that the State is not in a position to give
effective protection to its national who has a well founded fear of persecution, and that
international protection is the only available option for the person concerned. Clearly,
the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention would be contravened and the system for
the international protection of refugees would be rendered less effective if it were to be
held that an asylum-seeker should be denied protection unless a State could be held
accountable for the violation of his/her fundamental rights by a non-governmental actor.
It is essential that international protection is extended to such refugees and that the
principle of non-refoulement is fully respected."
Duty to seek protection from own state where reasonable: Austria, VwGH, 24.03.1994,
94/18-0082 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 53); Belgium, CPR, 4 April 1992, CPR, 1 Oct.
1993 CPR, 5 Mar. 1992 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 94); France, CRR, 4 Oct. 1991 (cited in
earlier 1997, at 402); Switzerland, ODR, 24 June 1992 (cited in earlier 1997, at 151);
United Kingdom, Horvath, [1999] I INLR 7 (H.L.).
ECRE (2000), at paras. 24-29.
ILPA (2000), at Art. l l(l)(c)-(d).
5.04 The risk that ensues from the deprivation of
State protection must be serious and unjustified.
This means that it must either constitute a basic
attack on internationally recognized human rights,
or in the light of all the facts of the case manifestly
preclude the applicant from returning to his or her
country of origin.

EU ( 1996), Art. 4: " ... [A]cts suffered or feared must... be sufficiently serious by their
nature or repetition: they must either constitute a basic attack on human rights, for
example, life, freedom or physical integrity, or, in the light of all the facts of the case,
manifestly preclude the person who has suffered them from continuing to live in his
country of origin ... "
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 51, 53.
European asylum jurisprudence recognizes that" ... the notion of persecution itself is
assessed by the level of the violation of human rights" (Carli er 1997, at 70 I).
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"Physical" human rights risks relevant: Belgium, CPR, 1 May 1992 (cited in Carlier
1997, at 88); France, Amina/a Diop, Commission des recours Dec. No. 164078, 18 Sep.
1991; Germany, VG Sigmaringen, 3 Sept. 1992, A 6 K 10110/92, VG Saar/and, 17 Dec.
1992, 6 K 214/88 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 266; France, D.R., suppl. No. 187, 6/15 Nov.
1988 (cited in earlier 1997, at 395).
"Psychological" human rights risks relevant: Germany, 2 BvR 1549/91 (1992); Swiss
asylum law, Art. 3, para. 2LA (cited in Carlier 1997, at 148); Spain, Tribunal supremo,
28 Sept. 1988 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 363).
"Economic" human rights risks relevant: Germany, VG Ansbach, 18 Mar. 1992, AN 19
K 91.39868, VG Trier, 12 Feb. 1992, 6 K 249/88 (cited in earlier 1997, at 268);
Netherlands,ARR v. S., 2 Feb. 1984 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 512); Portugal, ST.A., 23
June 1983 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 550); Spain, Audiencia nacional, 23 Feb. 1991 (cited
In Carlier 1997, at 364). But only qualified support in United Kingdom: Horvath,
[1999] 1 INLR 7.
ECRE (2000), at paras. 41 44-45.
5.05 The seriousness of harm is not to be
determined in the abstract, but shall take account of
both the degree of risk faced and any particular
vulnerabilities of the applicant for asylum

EU (1996), Art. 5.1.l(c): "It is important... to take account of all the circumstances
surrounding the individual measures reported by the asylum-seeker, in order to assess
whether his fears of persecution are well-founded."
ECRE (2000), at para. 42, 46.

5.05(a) Where the applicant for asylum is a child or
adolescent, the assessment of whether a given risk
is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution
shall take account of child-specific forms of human
rights violation, and be guided by the international
commitment to promote the best interests of the
child.

ECRE (2000), at paras. 13, 42, 62(d).
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
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5.05(b) Where the applicant for asylum is a
woman, account shall be taken of the fact that
persecution may be effected through sexual
violence or other gender-specific means.

EXCOM73 ( 1993 ): "The Executive Committee... [s]trongly condemns persecution
through sexual violence, which not only constitutes a gross violation of human rights, as
well as, when committed in the context of armed conflict, a grave breach of
humanitarian law, but is also a particularly serious offense to human dignity ... "
EXCOM81 (1997): "The Executive Committee ... urges States [to recognize] as refugees
women whose claims to refugee status are based upon a well-founded fear of
persecution ... including persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related
persecution ... "
EXCOM87 ( 1999): "The Executive Committee ... encourages States ... to promote wider
acceptance, and inclusion in their protection criteria of the notion that persecution may
be gender-related or effected through sexual violence ..."

5.06 Persecution may take the form of
administrative and/or judicial measures which
either have the appearance of legality and are
misused for the purposes of persecution, or are
carried out in breach of the law.

EU ( 1996), Art. 5.1 : "In addition to cases in which persecution takes the form of the use
of brute force, it may also take the form of administrative and/or judicial measures which
either have the appearance of legality and are misused for the purposes of persecution, or
are carried out in breach of the law."
ECRE (2000), at para. 22.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(6).

5.07 General measures to safeguard public order,
State security, or public health will not usually
amount to persecution. However, where the
measures taken or proposed restrict the exercise of
internationally recognized human rights, they must
meet the requirements for valid limitation of or
derogation from human rights obligations
established by international law, including the duty
to ensure that any exceptional measures are

EU ( 1996), Art. 5.1.1 (a): "The official authorities of a country are sometimes moved to
take general measures to maintain public order, safeguard State security, preserve public
health, etc. As required, such measures may include restrictions on the exercise of
certain freedoms. They may also be accompanied by the use of force, but such
restrictions or use of force do not in themselves constitute sufficient grounds for granting
refugee status to the individuals against whom the measures are directed. However, if it
emerges that such measures are being implemented in a discriminatory manner on or
more of the grounds mentioned in Article l(A) of the Geneva Convention and may have
sufficiently serious consequences, they may give rise to a well-founded fear of
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proportionate to the risks faced, and are imposed
and implemented without discrimination. Where
the requirements for lawful limitation or derogation
are not met, a harm of sufficient gravity resulting
from such a purported exercise of exceptional
authority shall ordinarily justify a finding of a risk
of being persecuted.

persecution on the part of individuals who are victims of their improper application.
Such is the case, in particular, where general measures are used to camouflage individual
measures taken against persons who, for the reasons mentioned in Article l(A), are
likely to be threatened by their authorities. Measures directed against one or more
specific categories of the population may be legitimate in a society, even when they
impose particular constraints or restrictions on certain freedoms. However, they may be
considered as justifying fears of persecution, in particular where the aim which they
pursue has been condemned by the international community, or where they are
manifestly disproportionate to the end sought, or where their implementation leads to
serious abuses aimed at treating a certain group differently and less favourably than the
population as a whole."
EU (1996), Art. 6: "In principle, use of the armed forces does not constitute persecution
where it is in accordance with international rules of war and internationally recognized
practice; however, it becomes persecution where, for instance, authority is established
over a particular area and its attacks on opponents or on the population [amount to
persecution] ... "
See Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency, Mr. Despouy, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19, 23 June 1997 requiring: respect for principles of legality,
proclamation, notification, time limitation, exceptional threat, and proportionality.
UNHCR Handbook, para. 59.
Germany: 2 BvR 502/86.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(4)(a).
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5.08 Criminal prosecution or punishment for
breach of an ordinary law of general application
will not usually amount to persecution. It may be
otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages
in discriminatory prosecution or adjudication; if it
imposes discriminatory punishment; or if its law
purports to criminalize the exercise of a basic
international human right or to require an
individual to commit acts which are in violation of
basic norms of international law. A harm of
sufficient gravity resulting from such a purported
exercise of criminal law authority is a form of
persecution.

EU ( 1996), Art. 5.1.2: "Whilst appearing to be lawful, prosecution or court sentences
may amount to persecution where they include a discriminatory element and where they
are sufficient severe ... "

5.08(a) Discriminatory prosecution occurs when a
criminal law provision is in principle applicable to
all, but is unjustifiably enforced against only
certain persons or groups of persons.

EU (1996), Art. 5.1.2(a): "Discriminatory prosecution ... concerns a situation in which
the criminal law provision is applicable to all but where only certain persons are
prosecuted on grounds of characteristics likely to lead to the award of refugee status. It
is therefore the discriminatory element in the implementation of prosecution policy
which is essential for recognizing a person as a refugee."

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 56-60.
ECRE (2000), at para. 47.

ECRE (2000), at para. 48.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(4)(c).
5.08(b) Discriminatory adjudication occurs when a
criminal law provision is enforced by means of a
process which unjustifiably denies certain persons
or groups of persons the procedural and other
rights extended to the population at large.

-24-

5. "... [O)f being persecuted ... "
5.08(c) Discriminatory punishment occurs when
the penalty for breach of a generally applicable
criminal law is more severe for certain persons or
groups of persons.

EU (l 996), Art. 5.1.2(b ): "Punishment or the threat thereof on the basis of a universally
applicable criminal law provision will be discriminatory if persons who breach the law
are punished but certain persons are subject to more severe punishment on account of
characteristics likely to lead to the award of refugee status. The discriminatory element
in the punishment imposed is essential. Persecution may be deemed to exist in the event
of a disproportionate sentence, provided that there is a link with one of the grounds
referred to in Article l(A)."
ECRE (2000), at para. 49.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(4)(d).

5.08(d) The legitimate scope of a State's criminal
law authority is circumscribed by basic norms of
international human rights law. Subject to any
express rules authorizing derogation from human
rights obligations, penalties of sufficient gravity
imposed for the exercise of a basic international
human right shall ordinarily justify a finding of a
risk of being persecuted.

Compare EU ( 1996), Art. 5.1.2: "Intentional breach of a criminal law provision whether applicable universal1y or to certain categories of persons - on account of the
grounds of persecution must be clearly the result of pronouncements or participation in
certain activities in the country of origin or be the objective consequence of
characteristics of the asylum-seeker liable to lead to the grant of refugee status. The
deciding factors are the nature of the punishment in relation to the offence committed,
the legal system and the human rights situation in the country of origin. Consideration
should be given to whether the intention breach of the criminal law provision can be
deemed unavoidable in the light of the individual circumstances of the person involved
and the situation in the country of origin."
ECRE (2000), at para. 50.
Compare ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(4)(e).

5.08(e) A penalty of sufficient gravity imposed for
failure or refusal to engage in any act within the
scope of the exclusion clauses set out in Art. l(F)
of the Refugee Convention amounts to persecution.

EU ( 1996), Art. I 0: "Similarly, refugee status may be granted, in the light of all the other
requirements of the definition, in cases of punishment for conscientious objection or
deliberate absence without leave and desertion on grounds of conscience if the
performance of his military duties were to have the effect of leading the person
concerned to participate in acts falling under the exclusion clauses in Article l(F) of the
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Geneva Convention."
UNHCR ( 1995), at para. 7: "UNHCR... considers that draft evaders and deserters could
also be refugees under the 1951 Convention if they were to be punished for their refusal
to participate in military action which is condemned by the international community, or
which is characterized by serious or systemic violations of international humanitarian
law."
United Kingdom: A/tun, 28 Jan. 2000 (CA).
5.09 Prosecution or punishment for refusal to meet
a general obligation to perform military service
(whether for conscientious objection, absence
without leave, evasion, or desertion) will not
usually amount to persecution. It may be
otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages
in discriminatory conscription; assigns duties or
conditions of service on a discriminatory basis;
imposes sanctions for failure to meet military
service obligations on a discriminatory basis; seeks
to require participation in military activities in
breach of international law; or fails to provide a
reasonable and non-discriminatory alternative to
military service for persons with genuine political,
religious, or moral convictions to military service.
A harm of sufficient gravity resulting from such a
purported exercise of authority to require military
service shall ordinarily justify a finding of a risk of
being persecuted.

Compare EU ( 1996), Art. 10: "The fear of punishment for conscientious objection,
absence without leave or desertion is investigated on an individual basis. It should in
itself be insufficient to justify recognition of refugee status. The penalty must be
assessed in particular in accordance with the principles set out in [principles governing
legal, administrative and police measures]. In cases of absence without leave or
desertion, the person concerned must be accorded refugee status if the conditions under
which military duties are performed themselves constitute persecution."
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 168-174.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 7: "Conscientious objection, draft evasion and desertion may
give rise to situations of persecution in the sense of Article 1 of the 1951 Convention.
Traditionally, UNHCR has considered this to be the case where a draft evader or deserter
would suffer disproportionate punishment on account of his/her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group, or where
performance of military service would be contrary to the applicant's genuine political,
religious, or moral convictions ... "
Discriminatory sanctions for failure to perform military service: Austria, VwGH,
29.06.1994, 93/01/0377 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 49); Belgium,, VB.C., 26 May 1992,
C.P.R., 21 Oct. 1993 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 80); Germany, VG, Hanover, 23 Sept.
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1992 ( cited in Carli er 1997, at 262 ); Denmark, RAB, 22 Dec. 1989 ( cited in Carlier 1997,
at 318); Netherlands, ARR v. S, 24 Jan. 1983, ARR v. S, 21 July 1994 (cited in Carli er
1997, at 503); United Kingdom, Zaitz, 28 Jan. 2000 (CA).
Inadequate options for conscientious objectors: Austria, VwGH, 21.09.1994, 94/01/0252
(cited in Cartier 1997, at 36); United Kingdom, Ali Kasim, lAT Dec. 5479, A/tun, 28 Jan.
2000 (CA), Zaitz, 28 Jan. 28 2000 (CA).
Service in breach of international law: Austria, Admin. Ct. Dec. VwGH 93/01/0377-6
(1994); Netherlands First Instance Court, Zwolle, Dec. No. 1494/1991.
ECRE (2000), at para. 62.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(5).

5.10 Persecution may arise from a combination of
circumstances which would not amount to
persecution if considered separately.

EU ( 1996), Art. 4: "Several types of persecution may occur together and the combination
of events each of which, taken separately, does not constitute persecution may,
depending on the circumstances, amount to actual persecution or be regarded as a serious
ground for fear of persecution."
Belgium, CPR, 4 Mar. 1992 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 89); Denmark, RAB, 13 Oct. 1993,
RAB, 11 May 1988, RAB, 9 Jan. 1989, RAB, 10 Mar. 1992 (cited In Cartier 1997, at 306,
319); Netherlands, ARR v. S, 31 Jan. 1984, ARR v. S., 11 Mar. 1982, ARR v. S., 10 Jan.
1981 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 505-506).
ECRE (2000), at para. 43.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(3).
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6.01 Not every person who has a well-founded fear
of being persecuted is a refugee. Unless the risk
faced by the applicant can be linked to at least one
of the five grounds enumerated in the Convention race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion - the
claim to asylum is not established.

Germany: 2 BvR 958/86 (1989).

6.02 It is not sufficient that an applicant is a person
defined by a Convention ground and also has a
well-founded fear of being persecuted. There must
be a causal connection between these two elements
of the definition.

United Kingdom: R. v. SSHD, ex parte Zibirila-Alassini, [ 1991] Imm. A.R. 367 ( 1991,
QB).

6.03 The causal connection required is between a
Convention ground and the applicant's wellfounded fear of "being persecuted." Because it is
the asylum-seeker's predicament which must be
based on a Convention ground, the duty to show a
causal connection is met when either the threat of
harm or the withholding of effective state
protection is based on a Convention ground.

United Kingdom: Horvath, 2 Dec. 1999 9 (CA), Shah and Islam, 25 Mar. 1999 (HL).

ECRE (2000), at para. 31.

6.04 A fear of being persecuted is for reasons of a
Convention ground whether it is experienced as an
individual, or as part of a group.
6.05 The "for reasons of' requirement does not
require the applicant for asylum or the group of
which he or she is a part to be more at risk than
other persons or groups in the country of origin.
The relevant question is instead whether the

But United Kingdom, Adan, [ I 998] 2 WLR 702 (HL).
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Convention ground is causally connected to the
applicant's predicament, irrespective of whether
other individuals or groups also face a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for the same or a
different Convention ground.
6.06 The Convention ground need not account for
the entirety of the risk of being persecuted, nor
even be its primary cause. It must, however, be an
appreciable explanatory factor. If the Convention
ground is no more than remotely connected to the
well-founded fear of being persecuted, refugee
status need not be recognized.
6.07 The requisite causal connection between the
applicant's predicament and a Convention ground
may be established by either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
6.08 Asylum seekers who come from a country in
which many or all persons face the risk of
generalized oppression or violence are nonetheless
entitled to be recognized as refugees if their race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion accounts for an
appreciable part of their well-founded fear of being
persecuted. If, on the other hand, the risk
established by the applicant is not causally
connected in some appreciable way to a
Convention ground, refugee status shall not be
recognized.

ECRE (2000), at introduction.
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6.09 Persons in flight from civil war or internal or
generalized armed conflict are not necessarily
Convention refugees, but neither are they
automatically excluded from refugee status. A
well-founded fear of being persecuted may arise in
a situation of war, particularly where war or
violence is a means of carrying out a persecutory
policy against one or more groups defined by race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion; or where the
State withholds its protection from an individual or
group for a Convention reason.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 6: "Reference to a civil or internal or generalized armed
conflict and the dangers it entails is not in itself sufficient to warrant the grant of refugee
status. Fear of persecution must in all cases be based on one of the grounds in Article
l(A) of the Geneva Convention and be individual in nature. In such situations,
persecution may stem from the legal authorities or third parties encouraged or tolerated
by them, or from de facto authorities in control of part of the territory within which the
State cannot afford its nationals protection."
EXCOM85 (1998): "The Executive Committee ... [e]xpresses deep concern about the
increasing use of war and violence as a means to carry out persecutory policies against
groups targeted on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion ... "
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 164-165.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 8: "UNHCR agrees with the position that asylum seekers
whose reasons for flight are based solely on their area of residence being stricken by war
are not covered by the 1951 Convention. It is appreciated, however, that many conflicts
take place against a political backdrop which may involve serious violations of human
rights, including the targeting of particular ethnic or religious groups. In a situation of
internal armed conflict, the aims of the warring parties, including a government's need
to protect itself, do not justify the use of indiscriminate shelling or bombardment, torture
or arbitrary punishment against certain sectors of the population. Such acts may be
considered, therefore, as giving rise to refugee status under the 1951 Convention. The
determination of refugee status will require a careful examination of the specific
circumstances surrounding the applicant's claim, including an assessment of the nature
of the conflict."
Belgium: Conseil d'Etat, 26 May 1993; Germany, 2 BvR 1863/89, 2 BvR 502/86.
ECRE (2000), at paras. 30-31.
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ILPA (2000), at Art. 11 (2).
6.10 It is not the duty of the applicant accurately to
identify the reason he or she has a well-founded
fear of being persecuted. The State determining the
claim to asylum shall decide which, if any,
Convention ground is causally connected to the
applicant's predicament.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 67.

6.11 The various Convention grounds frequently
overlap. It is immaterial whether the well-founded
fear of being persecuted arises from any single one
of these grounds or from a combination of two or
more of them. It may also be the case that the risk
of being persecuted arises only when two or more
Convention grounds combine in the same person,
in which case the combination of such grounds is
the basis for the well-founded fear of being
persecuted.

EU (1996), Art. 4: "Grounds of persecution may overlap."

6.12 The fact that the grounds are genuine or
simply attributed to the applicant by the State or
non-governmental agent of persecution is
immaterial.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 66, 67.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 4: "UNHCR reaffirms that all the grounds named in the 1951
Convention for persecution continue to be relevant, and that it is immaterial whether the
persecution arises from any single one of these reasons or from a combination of two or
more of them."

EU ( 1996), Art. 4: "The fact that these grounds are genuine or simply attributed to the
person concerned by the persecutor is immaterial."
Germany: BvR 472/91 (1992); United Kingdom, Buapim v. SSHD, [1991] Imm. A.R. 78.
ECRE (2000), at para. 51.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(2).

6.13 An individual shall not be expected to deny
his or her identity or beliefs in order to avoid
coming to the attention of the State or non-

Compare EU (1996), Art. 7.4: "Holding political opinions different from those of the
government is not in itself a sufficient grounds for securing refugee status; the applicant
must show that... the authorities know about his political opinions or attribute them to
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governmental agent of persecution. The relevant
inquiry is whether the State or non-governmental
agent of persecution is aware, or could reasonably
be expected to become aware, of the applicant's
race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group, or political opinion.

him ..."
Compare United Kingdom, Binbasi, [1989] Imm. A.R. 565.
ECRE (2000), at paras. 58-59.

6.14 Care shall be taken not to confuse the reason
an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted with the form which that
persecution may take. In particular, a woman or
girl may face the risk of a gender-specific form of
persecution on the grounds of her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership of a
particular social group.
6.15 "Race" includes the full range of sociological
understandings of race, including those based on
colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin.

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1969), Art. I (1 ).
Compare EU ( 1996), Art. 7.1: "The concept of race should be understood in the broad
sense and include membership of different ethnic groups. As a general rule, persecution
should be deemed to be founded on racial grounds where the persecutor regards the
victim of his persecution as belonging to a racial group other than his own, by reason of
a real or supposed difference, and this forms the grounds for his action."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 68.
UNHCR ( 1995), at para. 4: "The concept of race has to be understood in its widest sense
to include all kinds of ethnic groups."
United Kingdom: Horvath, [1999] 1 INLR 7.
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ECRE (2000), at para. 52.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 12(1).
6.16 "Religion" includes the holding of, or failure
to hold, any belief. It also includes participation in,
or abstention from, formal worship in private or in
public, either alone or in community with others,
other religious acts or expressions of view, or
forms of personal or communal conduct based on
or mandated by any religious belief.

United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief ( 1981 ).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 18: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom of change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 18: "Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching. No one shall be subject to coercion which
would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Freedom
to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others."
Compare EU (1996), Art. 7.2: "The concept of religion may be understood in the broad
sense and include[s] theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. Persecution on religious
grounds may take various forms, such as a total ban on worship and religious instruction,
or severe discriminatory measures against persons belonging to a particular religious
group. For persecution to occur, the interference and impairment suffered must be
sufficiently severe in the light of the criteria [for defining persecution]. .. This may apply
where, over and above measures essential to maintain public order, the State also
penalizes religious activity even in private life. Persecution on religious grounds may
also occur where such interference targets a person who does not wish to profess any
religion, refuses to take up a particular religion or does not wish to comply with all or

-33-

6. " ... [Flor reasons of race, relieion, nationality, membership of a particular social eroup or political opinion ..."

part of the rites and customs relating to a religion."
UNHCR (1995), at para. 4: "With regard to religion as a ground for persecution, it
should be borne in mind that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Human Rights (sic) proclaim the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion."
ECRE (2000), at para. 53.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 12(2).
6. l 6(a) An applicant who has a well-founded fear
of being persecuted by reason of conscientious
objection to military service may qualify for
refugee status on the grounds of religion.

United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1998/77, noting that" ... the right of
everyone to have conscientious objections to military service [is] a legitimate exercise of
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion."
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 71-72.

6.17 "Nationality" includes citizenship or the lack
thereof, as well as membership of a group defined
by its cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity,
common geographical or political origins, or its
relationship with the population of another State.

EU ( 1996), Art. 7.3: "This should not be confined exclusively to the idea of citizenship
but should also include membership of a group determined by its cultural or linguistic
identity or its relationship with the population of another State."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 74.
UNHCR ( 1995), at para. 4: "The term nationality is not to be understood only as
citizenship, but also refers to membership of an ethnic or linguistic group, and may
overlap with the term 'race."'
ECRE (2000), at para. 54.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 12(3).

6.18 "Political opinion" includes an opinion on a

Compare EU (1996), Art. 7.4: "Holding political opinions different from those of the

-34-

6. " ... [Flor reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion ..."
matter on which the machinery of state,
government, or policy may be engaged, whether or
not that opinion has been acted upon by the
applicant. The political nature of an opinion is not
compromised by the objective unimportance of the
applicant's opinions or relevant actions, or by his
or her own failure or unwillingness to characterize
the opinion as political.

government is not in itself a sufficient ground for securing refugee status; the applicant
must show that the authorities know about his political opinions or attribute them to him;
those opinions are not tolerated by the authorities; [and] given the situation in his
country he would be likely to be persecuted for holding such opinions."
UNHCR (1995), at para. 4: "With regard to political opinion, it is not always necessary
that the opinions have been expressed for persecution to occur ..."
Germany: Administrative Court, Ansbach Dec. 5 K 87.38024 (1989).
ECRE (2000), at paras. 60-61.

6. l 8(a) In particular, a refusal to engage in or to
support activities contrary to international law is a
form of political opinion.

EU (1996), Art. 10: " ... [R]efugee status may be granted, in the light of all the other
requirements of the definition, in cases of punishment of conscientious objection or
deliberate absence without leave and desertion on grounds of conscience if the
performance of his military duties were to have the effect of leading the person
concerned to participate in acts falling under the exclusion clauses in Article l(F) of the
Geneva Convention."
UNHCR (1995), at para. 7: "UNHCR further considers that draft evaders and deserters
could also be refugees under the 1951 Convention if they were to be punished for their
refusal to participate in military action which is condemned by the international
community, or which is characterized by serious or systematic violations of international
humanitarian law."
United Kingdom: R. v. SSHD, ex parte Aouiche, ( 1991) Times 4 June.
ECRE (2000), at para. 62(d) [regarding claims by children who fear conscription into
military service, contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child].
ILPA (2000), at Art. 10(5)(b).
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6.19 "Membership of a particular social group" is
an open-ended concept which comprises affiliation
with any group comprised of persons who share a
common characteristic which is fundamental to
identity or conscience. The group may be defined
by an immutable characteristic (such as sex or
gender, sexual orientation, age, family relationship,
or history) or by an attribute which is so
fundamental to identity or conscience that members
of the group should not be required to renounce it
(such as trade union membership or the advocacy
of human rights). The concept is not confined to
narrowly defined, small groups of persons, and no
voluntary associational relationship or de facto
cohesion of members is required.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 7.5: "A specific social group normally comprises persons from
the same background, with the same customs or the same social status, etc. Fear of
persecution cited under this heading may frequently overlap with fear of persecution on
other grounds, for example, race, religion or nationality. Membership of a social group
may simply be attributed to the victimized person or group by the persecutor."
EXCOM39 (1985): "The Executive Committee ... [r]ecognized that States, in the
exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that women asylumseekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the social
mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a 'particular social group'
within the meaning of Article l(A)(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention."
EXCOM87 (1999): "The Executive Committee ... encourages States ... to promote wider
acceptance, and inclusion in their protection criteria of the notion that persecution may
be gender-related ... "
Re general definition by immutable or fundamental characteristic: Belgium, VBC, 8 Apr.
1992 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 100-101); Germany, VG Ansbach, 19 Feb. 1992, AN 17 K
91.44245 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 283), 2 BvR 502/86, Admin. Ct. Bavaria Dec. No.
AN 17 K 91.44245 (1992); United Kingdom, Otchere, [1988] Imm. A.R. 21, Vraciu, 21
Nov. 1994, IAT Dec. No. 11559 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 600-601), Shah and Islam, 25
Mar. 1999 (HL).
Re sex as basis for particular social group: Germany, VG Ansbach, 19 Feb. 1992, AN 17
K 91.44245 (cited in Cartier 1997, at 283); Netherlands, Pres. Haar/em, 28 Nov. 1985,
N.A. V.R., 1986, ARR v. S, 28 Oct. 1991, HR, 14 Dec. 1990 ( cited in Carlier 1997, at
517); United Kingdom, Shah and Islam, 25 Mar. 1999 (HL ); but Denmark, RAB, 31 May
1991, RAB, 11 June 1992, RAB, 9 Feb. 1994, RAB, 31 May 1994 (cited in Cartier 1997,
at 331 ). Re sexual orientation as basis for particular social group: Germany, BverwG, 15
Mar. 1988, 9 C 177 .86; Netherlands, ARR v S, 28 Oct. 1991, ARR v. S., 13 Aug. 1981,
ARR v. S., 28 July 1983 ( cited in Carlier 1997, at 516); United Kingdom, Jain v. SSHD,
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6 Oct. 1999 (CA), Shah and Islam, 25 Mar. 1999 (HL); but Denmark, RAB, 5 Dec. 1991,
RAB 26 Jan. 1993 ( cited in Carli er 1997, at 331 ); UNHRC, Toonen v. Australia, Comm.
No. 488/1992 (1994, holding sexual orientation to be a protected ground under rubric of
'sex' in ICCPR). Re age as a basis for particular social group: Switzerland, CRA, 7 Dec.
1992 (cited in earlier 1997, at 156).
See Ireland, Refugee Act 1996: "Membership of a particular social group includes
membership of a trade union and also membership of a group of persons whose defining
characteristic is their belonging to the female or the male sex or having a particular
sexual orientation."
6. I 9(a) While susceptibility to persecution may
give visibility to a particular social group, the
group must nonetheless exist and be defined
independently of the well-founded fear of being
persecuted.

Compare EU (1996), at Art. 7.5: "In some cases, the social group may not have existed
previously but may be determined by the common characteristics of the victimized
persons because the persecutor sees them as an obstacle to achieving his aims."
Compare UNHCR ( 1995), at para. 4: "Social groups may be defined either by preexisting criteria, or by some common characteristics in a victimized group, as typified by
some forms of gender-based persecution."
United Kingdom: Shah and Islam, 25 Mar. 1999 (HL}.
ECRE (2000), at para. 57.
Compare ILPA (2000), at Art. 12(4)(d).
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nationality... is unable or, owin,: to such fear, is unwillin,: to return to it."
7.0 l Refugee status shall be recognized only in the
case of a person who is either unable or
legitimately unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the country of origin's protection against the
significant risk of being persecuted. This
requirement is met if:
7.0 l(a) The state of origin is the direct or indirect
agent of persecution.

EU ( 1996), Art. 5.1: "Persecution is generally the act of a State organ (central State or
federal States, regional and local authorities) whatever its status in international law, or
of parties or organizations controlling the state."
EU (l 996), Art. 5.1.1: "In all the cases referred to above [legal, administrative, and
police measures], consideration must be given to whether there is an effective remedy or
remedies which would put an end to the situation of abuse. As a general rule,
persecution will be indicated by the fact that no redress exists or, if there are means of
redress, that the individuals concerned are deprived of the opportunity of having access
to them or by the fact that the decisions of the competent authority are not impartial... or
have no effect."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 65.
ECRE (2000), at paras. 21-22.
ILPA (2000), at Arts. l l(l)(a)-(b).

7.01 (b) The state of origin is unwilling effectively
to protect the asylum seeker from being persecuted.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 5.2: "Persecution by third parties will be considered to fall
within the scope of the Geneva Convention where it is based on one of the grounds in
Article l(A), is individual in nature and is encouraged or permitted by the authorities.
Where the official authorities fail to act, such persecution should give rise to individual
examination of each application for refugee status, in accordance with national judicial
practice, in the light in particular of whether or not the failure to act was deliberate ... "
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UNHCR Handbook, para. 65.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 5: "It is generally accepted by States and reflected in State
practice that a refugee claim under Article I of the 1951 Convention can be established
if the State is the agent of persecution. This is equally the case when persons are
exposed to persecution by non-governmental entities which have some link with the
State, or whose activities are encouraged or tolerated by the State."
ECRE (2000), at paras. 21, 24.
ILPA (2000), at Art. I l(l)(c)-(d).
7.0l(c) The state of origin is not capable of
effectively responding to the risk of being
persecuted. In this case, however, the asylum
seeker shall demonstrate that he or she has made all
reasonable efforts to secure the protection of the
national government of the state of origin, or that
such efforts would be manifestly unlikely to
succeed.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 65.
UNHCR (1995), at para. 5: " ... [P]ersecution may also emanate from entities for which
no link with the State can be established and which the State is unable to control. The
essential issue in establishing the basis and justification for the extension of
international protection is the fact of an absence of national protection against
persecution, whether or not this deficiency can be attributed to an affirmative intention
to harm on the part of the State. Persecution that does not involve State complicity is
still, nonetheless, persecution. In such cases, it must be concluded that the State is not in
a position to give effective protection to its national who has a well founded fear of
persecution, and that international protection is the only available option for the person
concerned. Clearly, the spirit and purpose of the 1951 Convention would be
contravened and the system for the international protection of refugees would be
rendered less effective if it were to be held that an asylum-seeker should be denied
protection unless a State could be held accountable for the violation of his/her
fundamental rights by a non-governmental actor. It is essential that international
protection is extended to such refugees and that the principle of non-refoulement is fully
respected."
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Duty to seek protection from own state where reasonable: Austria, VwGH, 24.03.1994,
94/18-0082 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 53); Belgium, CPR, 4 April 1992, CPR, I Oct.
1993 CPR, 5 Mar. 1992 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 94); France, CRR, 4 Oct. 1991 (cited in
Carlier 1997, at402); Switzerland, ODR, 24 June 1992 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 151);
United Kingdom, Horvath, [1999] I INLR 7 (H.L.).
ECRE (2000), at paras. 21, 25-29
Compare ILPA (2000), at Art. I 0(7) ..
7 .02 Where it appears that the risk of being
persecuted is clearly confined to a specific part of
the territory of the country of origin, the
requirement that a refugee be" ... unable or, owing
to such fear (of being persecuted), is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country"
authorizes an inquiry to determine whether the
person concerned can find effective State
protection in another part of his or her own
country, to which he or she may reasonably be
returned.

EU (1996), Art. 8: "Where it appears that persecution is clearly confined to a specific
part of a country's territory, it may be necessary, in order to check that the condition laid
down in Article l(A) of the Geneva Convention has been fulfilled, namely that the
person concerned 'is unable or, owing to such fear (of persecution), is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country,' to ascertain whether the person concerned
cannot find effective protection in another part of his own country, to which he may
reasonably be expected to move."
Compare ECRE (2000), at para. 36.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 13( I).

7.03 The relevant inquiry is not whether an
applicant might have avoided departure from her or
his country of origin. Nor is it an assessment of
whether the risk of being persecuted can presently
be avoided somewhere inside the asylum seeker's
country of origin.
7.04 Analysis shall be directed to the identification
of asylum seekers who do not require international

UNHCR (1995), para. 6: "The underlying assumption for the application of the notion of
internal flight is a regionalized failure of the State to protect its citizens from
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protection because they can presently access
meaningful protection of their country in a part of
that country's territory. Where a careful inquiry
determines that a particular asylum seeker has
access to internal protection, refugee status shall be
denied.

persecution."
Compare UNHCR (1995), para. 6: "The possibility to find safety in other parts of the
country must have existed at the time of flight and continue to be available when the
eligibility decision is taken and the return to the country of origin is implemented."
"The international community was meant to be a forum of second resort for the
persecuted, a 'surrogate,' approachable upon the failure of local protection. The
rationale upon which international refugee law rests is not simply the need to give
shelter to those persecuted by the state, but ... to provide refuge to those whose home
state cannot or does not afford them protection from persecution": Ward (Supreme Court
of Canada).
ILPA (2000), at Art. 13(2).

7 .05 Consideration of the possibility of denying
refugee status on internal protection grounds shall
take place only once it is determined that the
applicant otherwise has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for a Convention reason. This is
because the reality of access to internal protection
can only be adequately measured on the basis of an
understanding of the precise risks faced by the
applicant.

UNHCR ( 1995), para. 6: "Due to the complexity of the issues involved, the concept of
internal flight alternative should not be applied in the framework of accelerated
procedures."

7.06 The State determining the claim to asylum
shall in all cases establish a primafacie case that a
particular region of the country of origin meets the
internal protection criteria set out below. Once
such a case has been made, the burden of proof
shifts to the applicant for asylum to demonstrate
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why the criteria are not satisfied.
7.07 First, a present possibility of meaningful
protection inside the State of origin exists only if
the applicant can be returned to the internal region
adjudged to satisfy the criteria for internal
protection. A refugee claim shall not be denied on
internal protection grounds where there is evidence
that the State assessing the claim cannot legally,
safely, and practically return the asylum seeker to
the site of internal protection.

UNHCR (l 995), para. 6: "Above all, an internal flight alternative must be accessible in
safety and durable in character."
ECRE (2000), at para. 37.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 13(2).

7.08 Second, there must be no significant risk that
the agent of persecution will be present in the
designated place of internal protection in the
foreseeable future. Because refugee status
assessment requires a forward-looking assessment
of risk, it is not enough simply to find that the
original agent of persecution has not yet established
a presence in the proposed site of internal
protection.
7.08(a) Because a national government is presumed
to be entitled to act throughout the whole of the
national territory, there is a strong presumption
against finding internal protection to be available if
the agent of persecution is, or is sponsored by, the
national government. Internal protection is most
likely to prove viable when the harm is threatened
by a non-state agent.

UNHCR (1995), para. 6: "The underlying assumption for the application of the notion of
internal flight is a regionalized failure of the State to protect its citizens from
persecution. Under such circumstances, it is assured that the State authorities are willing
to protect a person against persecution by non-State agents, but they have been
prevented, or otherwise are unable to assure, such protection in certain areas of the
country. Therefore, the notion should not, in principle, be applied in situations where
the person is fleeing persecution from State authorities, even if the same authorities may
refrain from persecution in other parts of the country."
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ECRE (2000), at para. 38.
7.09 Third, there must be no well-founded fear of
being persecuted by reason of return to the
proposed site of internal protection. This
determination shall be made on the basis of sound
knowledge and evaluation of the prevailing
security, political and social conditions in that part
of the country.

UNHCR (1995), para. 6: "A decision concerning the existence of an internal flight
alternative should be based on a profound knowledge and evaluation of the prevailing
security, political and social conditions in that part of the country."
ECRE (2000), at para. 37.
Compare ILPA (2000), at Art. 13(2).

7.09(a) This means that the original well-founded
fear of being persecuted must not simply be
replaced by a new or different risk of being
persecuted.
7.09(b) It also means that there must be no
foreseeable prospect of indirect refoulement to the
region in which a well-founded fear of being
persecuted has been found to exist. In assessing the
risk of indirect refoulement, account shall be taken
of the intensity of the harms specific to the
proposed site of internal protection (such as, for
example, famine or sustained conflict). Where
these rise to a particularly high level, albeit perhaps
not amounting to a risk of being persecuted, an
asylum seeker may in practice feel compelled to
abandon the proposed site of protection, even if the
only alternative is return to a known risk of being
persecuted elsewhere in the country of origin.

ECRE (2000), at para. 37.

7. l 0 Fourth, because the denial of refugee status is

UNHCR (1995), para. 6: "An effective internal flight alternative can only exist when the

ILPA (2000), at Art. 13(2).
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predicated not simply on the absence of a risk of
being persecuted, but more fundamentally on the
availability of internal protection, there must be
evidence that the applicant's own State can and
will provide meaningful protection to him or her in
the proposed site of internal protection. Internal
protection requires not only that the applicant be
protected against the risk of being persecuted, but
also that he or she enjoy protection there, including
respect for human rights and access to basic public
services on terms of equality with other persons
living in the site of internal protection.

conditions correspond to the standards deriving from the 1951 Convention and other
major human rights instruments."

7 .1 0(a) In determining whether the applicant's
own State can and will provide meaningful
protection, the stability of that country and of its
national government shall be taken into account.

Sweden: Decision UD98/780/MP, June 29, 2000 ("Minority Bosnians Decision").

7. I 0(b) Because it is access to "the protection of
that country" that provides the rationale for
denying asylum on internal protection grounds, the
possibility of returning an applicant to a region
contro11ed by a non-state entity is not a basis for
denying refugee status.

ECRE (2000), at para. 37.

ECRE (2000), at para. 37.
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8. "This Convention shall cease to apply to any person if..."

8.01 Once a person's status as a refugee has been
determined, it is maintained until and unless he or
she comes within the terms of one of the cessation
clauses in Art. 1(C) of the Refugee Convention.
The cessation clauses are exhaustive. This strict
approach provides refugees with the assurance that
their status will not be subject to constant review,
and that any decision to bring refugee status to an
end will be based on clearly stated standards.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 112, 116.
UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 6.
UNHCR ( 1995), para. 9: "Article 1(C) covers cases where the protection of the 1951
Convention is no longer necessary ... "
ECRE (2000), at para. 73.

8.02 In principle, application of the cessation
clauses is declaratory, acknowledging that
international refugee protection is no longer
required. It operates to withdraw refugee status,
and brings to an end entitlement to the rights
associated with refugee status.

UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 6.

8.03 The State of asylum bears the burden of proof
to establish that an individual has ceased to be a
refugee for a reason stipulated in Art. l(C). A
decision to withdraw refugee status shall be based
on objective and verifiable evidence, and shall
always be investigated on an individual basis. The
refugee shall have the opportunity to contest the
application of Art. I (C).

EU ( 1996), Art. 11 : "Whether or not refugee status may be withdrawn on the basis of
Article l(C) of the Geneva Convention is always investigated on an individual basis.
The Member States should make every effort, by exchanging information, to harmonize
their practice with regard to the application of the cessation clauses of Article l(C)
wherever possible. The circumstances in which the cessation clause[s] in Article I(C)
may be applied should be of a fundamental nature and should be determined in an
objective and verifiable manner. Information provided by the Centre for Information,
Discussion and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA) and the UNHCR may be of considerable
relevance here."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 7.
ECRE (2000), at para. 72.
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8. "This Convention shall cease to a1mll:'. to any Rerson if... "

ILPA (2000), at Art. 15(2).
8.04 A State invoking a cessation clause shall deal
humanely with affected individuals or groups, and
in particular shall facilitate their return to the
country of origin in a fair and dignified manner.

EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee ... [r]ecommends that States, in giving
effect to a decision to invoke the cessation clauses, should in all circumstances deal
humanely with the consequences for the affected individuals or groups, and that
countries of asylum and countries of origin should together facilitate the return, to assure
that it takes place in a fair and dignified manner."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 10.
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S(a} "He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the urotection of the countn: of his nationality..."

S(a).01 A refugee who voluntarily seeks and
obtains from the authorities of his or her country of
origin a form of diplomatic protection available
only to nationals of that country, such as the
issuance or renewal of a national passport, may
thereby cease to be a refugee. For this to be so,
however, the refugee must specifically intend by
the action to re-avail himself or herself of the
protection of that country.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 118-125.
ECRE (2000), at para. 70.

8(a).02 Where the contact between a refugee and
the diplomatic mission of his or her country of
origin is incidental, it is unlikely to evince the
requisite intention to secure that State's protection.

UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 12.

S(a).03 A refugee who seeks and obtains
diplomatic protection from his or her country of
origin on the instructions of authorities of an
asylum State cannot be said to have acted
voluntarilv.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 120.
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 12.
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8{b) "Havini: lost his nationalitvs he has voluntarily re-acguired it..."

8(b).01 A refugee who has lost the nationality of
his or her country of origin, and who voluntarily
seeks and receives again the nationality of that
State, thereby ceases to be a refugee. The reacquisition of nationality de Jure alone is
insufficient to justify application of the cessation
clause. Voluntary re-acquisition of former
nationality must be accompanied by the actual
restoration of relations between the individual and
the country of nationality.
8(b).0l(a) The granting of nationality by operation
of law or by decree does not amount to voluntary
re-acquisition of nationality, unless the nationality
has been expressly or impliedly accepted by the
refugee.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 126-127.
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 13.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 128.
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8(c) "He has acguired a new nationalitI~ and enjoys the ~rotection of the country of his new nationalitI... "
8(c).0l Because an individual who enjoys national
protection is not in need of international protection,
refugee status is lost upon acquisition of a new and
effective nationality. The acquisition of nationality
de Jure alone is insufficient to justify application of
the cessation clause. Acquisition of nationality
must be accompanied by the actual establishment
of relations between the individual and the country
of nationality.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 129-130.
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 15.

8(c).0l(a) In particular, an individual cannot be
said to enjoy protection as a national unless he or
she is entitled to enter the territory of the State of
nationality, and to reside there indefinitely with
protection against deportation or expulsion.

Civil and Political Covenant, Art. 12(4): "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country."

S(c).02 An individual who ceases to be a refugee
by operation of this clause is not precluded from
seeking asylum anew on the grounds that he or she
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the
new country of nationality.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 13 I.

8(c).03 Where refugee status has come to an end by
virtue of the acquisition of a new nationality, and
the new nationality is subsequently lost, refugee
status may be revived, depending on the
circumstances.

UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 17.

UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 18.
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8(d) "He has voluntarily re-established himself in the counta which he left or outside of which he has remained owinK to fear of
nersecution ..."
8(d).0 l Voluntary re-establishment in the country
of origin is perhaps the clearest evidence that a
refugee does not have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted in that country. A refugee who returns
to his or her country of origin with a view to
residing there on an ongoing basis thereby ceases to
be a refugee.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 133.

8(d).02 Voluntary re-establishment shall not,
however, be equated with voluntary return to the
country of origin for serious reasons on a shortterm, strictly temporary basis.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 134.
ECRE (2000), at para. 70.

8( d).03 A consistent pattern of regular return visits
to the country of origin may nonetheless over time
amount to re-establishment in that country. This is
particularly so if the refugee avails himself or
herself of the benefits and facilities in the country
normally enjoyed by citizens.

UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 12.

8(d).04 A person whose right to asylum has been
recognized shall retain that status for a period of at
least six months after departure from the State
which recognized that status, if such departure is
authorized by the asylum State and is made for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not conditions
in the country of origin have improved sufficiently
to enable the resumption of permanent residence
there.

ECRE (2000), at para. 70.
IPLA (2000), at Art. 15(4 ).
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8{e) "He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality... (or in the case of a stateless refugee, he is) able to
return to the country of his former habitual residence..."

8(e).0l Refugee status comes to an end if and when
a change of circumstances in a refugee's country of
origin is of such a profound and durable nature that
it eliminates the refugee's well-founded fear of
being persecuted.

EXCOM65 (1991): "The Executive Committee ... [u]nderlines the possibility of the use
of the cessation clauses of the 1951 Convention in situations where a change of
circumstances in a country is of such a profound and enduring nature that refugees from
that country no longer require international protection, and can no longer continue to
refuse to avail themselves of the protection of their country, provided that it is
recognized that compelling circumstances may, for certain individuals, support the
continuation ofrefugee status ..." (Affirmed in EXCOM69, 1992).
EXCOM69 ( 1992): "The Executive Committee ... [e]mphasizes that the 'ceased
circumstances' cessation clauses shall not apply to refugees who continue to have a
well-founded fear of persecution."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 19.
ECRE (2000), at para. 72.
ILPA (2000), at Art. 15(3)(a).

8(e).02 A profound change of circumstances is not
the same as an improvement in conditions in the
country of origin. The relevant inquiry is whether
there has been a fundamental change of substantial
political or social significance which has produced
a stable power structure different from that under
which the original well-founded fear of being
persecuted was produced. A complete political
change is the most obvious example of a profound
change of circumstances, although the holding of
democratic elections, declaration of an amnesty,
repeal of oppressive laws, or dismantling of former

EU ( 1996), Art. 11: "The circumstances in which the cessation clause in Article 1(C)
may be applied should of a fundamental nature ... "
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee ... [s]tresses that, in taking any decision
on application of the cessation clauses based on 'ceased circumstances,' States must
carefully assess the fundamental character of the changes in the country of nationality ..."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 20.
Germany: Admin. Ct. Ansbach Dec. AN 17 K 91.42844 (1992).
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security services may also be evidence of such a
transition.
8(e).03 A profound change of circumstances may
be said to be durable only after the State of asylum
has carefully monitored conditions in the country
of origin for a reasonable period of time. A
situation which has changed, but which also
continues to show signs of volatility, is by
definition not durable. There must be objective and
verifiable evidence that human rights are generally
respected in that country, and in particular that the
factors which gave rise to the refugee's wellfounded fear of being persecuted are durably
suppressed or eliminated. Practical developments
such as organized repatriation and the experience
of returnees, as well as the reports of independent
observers shall be given considerable weight.

EU ( 1996), Art. 11 : "The circumstances in which the cessation clause in Article 1(C)
may be applied ... should be determined in an objective and verifiable manner.
Information provided by the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on
Asylum (CIREA) and the UNHCR may be of considerable relevance here."
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee... believ[es] that a careful approach to
the application of the cessation clauses using clearly established procedures is necessary
so as to provide refugees with the assurance that their status will not be subject to
unnecessary review in the light of temporary changes, not of a fundamental character, in
the situation prevailing in the country of origin."
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee... [s]tresses that, in taking any decision
on application of the cessation clauses based on 'ceased circumstances,' States must
carefully assess ... the general human rights situation, as well as the particular cause of
fear of persecution, in order to make sure in an objective and verifiable way that the
situation which justified the granting of refugee status has ceased to exist."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at paras. 21, 23.
ECRE (2000), at para. 72.

8(e).03(a) While there can be no firm rule about
how long assessment of a profound change of
circumstances should continue before it may
reasonably be said to be durable, scrutiny over at
least 12-18 months will usually be required. Where
the change takes place peacefully under a

UNHCR Discussion Note on the Application of the Changed Circumstances Cessation
Clause, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/1992/CRP.1 (re 12-18 month minimum assessment period).
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at paras. 21-22.
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constitutional and democratic process, an
assessment of durable change may often be made
within a relatively short time. On the other hand,
change which takes place in a violent environment
or in the context of an ongoing process of national
reconciliation may call for a more prolonged period
of assessment.
8(e).04 While in some cases general evidence will
warrant a presumption in favour of cessation of
status for a group of similarly situated refugees,
each individual refugee affected shall be afforded
the opportunity for an examination of
circumstances relevant to his or her individual case.

EU ( 1996), Art. 11: "Whether or not refugee status may be withdrawn on the basis of
Article l(C) of the Geneva Convention is always investigated on an individual basis."
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee ... not[es] that any declaration by the
High Commissioner that the competence accorded to her by the Statute of her Office
with regard to certain refugees shall cease to apply may be useful to States in connection
with the application of the cessation clauses ..."
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee ... [r]ecognizes ... that all refugees
affected by a group or class decision to apply these cessation clauses must have the
possibility, upon request, to have such application in their cases reconsidered on grounds
relevant to their individual case."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at paras. 27, 37.
Denmark, Report of 1983-1987, at 67 (cited in Carlier 1997, at 308); Spain, Tribunal
supremo, 10 Dec. 1985.
ECRE (2000), at para. 72.
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8(e).05 The State invoking this cessation clause
shall consider an appropriate status, preserving
previously acquired rights, for persons who have
compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to re-avail themselves of
the protection of their country of origin.

By analogy to Refugee Convention, Art. l(C)(S) and (6).
UNHCR Handbook, para. 136.
EXCOM69 (1992): "The Executive Committee... [r]ecommends, so as to avoid hardship
cases, that States seriously consider an appropriate status, preserving previously
acquired rights, for persons who have compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to re-avail themselves of the protection of their country and
recommends also that appropriate arrangement, which would not put into jeopardy their
established situation, be similarly considered by relevant authorities for those persons
who cannot be expected to leave the country of asylum, due to a long stay in that country
resulting in strong family, social and economic links there."
UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Cessation Clauses), at para. 24.
Denmark, RAB, 21 Feb. 1992, RAB, 19 April 1990, RAB, 6 May 1991 (cited in Cartier
1997, at 304).
ECRE (2000), at para. 72.
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9. "This Convention shall not a1mll'. to nersons who are at nresent receivina= from ora=ans or aa=encies of the United Nations other than
the United Nations Hia=h Commissioner for Refua=ees nrotection or assistance. When such nrotection or assistance has ceased for anl'.
reason without the nosition of such uersons beina= definitivelJ settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General
Assembll'. of the United Nations 2 these nersons shaJI iJ!..so lacto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention."
9.01 An individual who has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for a Convention reason, but who
is at present benefiting from the protection or
assistance of a United Nations agency (other than
that of the UNHCR) is excluded from refugee
status.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 12: "Any person who deliberately removes himself from the
protection and assistance referred to in Article l(D) of the Geneva Convention is no
longer automatically covered by that Convention. In such cases, refugee status is in
principle to be determined in accordance with Article l(A)."

9.02 For purposes of this clause, the protection or
assistance available from the United Nations
agency must have the effect of eliminating or
durably suppressing the individual's well-founded
fear of being persecuted.
9.03 An individual is excluded from refugee status
on grounds of United Nations protection or
assistance only if he or she has received such
protection or assistance before seeking asylum, and
has not at any time ceased to receive such
protection or assistance.

ECRE (2000), at para. 68.

9.04 Exclusion under this clause shall not occur if
an individual is prevented by circumstances beyond
his or her control from returning to the place in
which he or she is in principle entitled to benefit
from United Nations protection or assistance.

ECRE (2000), at para. 68.

9.05 Any person who is excluded from refugee
status by operation of this clause shall
automatically be entitled to recognition as a refugee

Compare Germany: BverwG I C 42.88 ( 1991 ), which applied this clause in relation to a
person who voluntarily left UNRWA territory, but was presently prevented from
returning to it.
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at such time as the protection or assistance afforded
by the relevant United Nations agency may for any
reason cease without definitive resolution by the
General Assembly of the concerns of the protected
population.
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10. "This Convention shall not a1mly to a nerson who is recoz:nized by the comnetent authorities of the country in which he has taken
residence as havine the riehts of the nationalitt of that countn:."

I 0.0 I Only an individual who has "taken
residence" in a State in which he or she has no
well-founded fear of being persecuted shall be
excluded under this clause. Mere transient or
purely temporary presence in such a State is not a
basis for exclusion.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 146.

10.02 An individual shall be excluded only ifhe or
she is effectively assimilated to the citizens of the
State of residence for purposes of human rights
protection and, in particular, is guaranteed full
protection against deportation or expulsion.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 144-145.

10.03 Whatever rights an individual once enjoyed,
the applicability of Art. 1(E) shall be decided on
the basis of the situation existing at the date of the
assessment of refuj!ee status.

-57-

11. "The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considerine
that..."
11.01 To ensure that the integrity of the institution
of asylum is not undermined, no person defined in
Art. 1(F) of the Convention may under any
circumstance be recognized as a refugee.
Exclusion shall also occur where the facts requiring
exclusion become known after the recognition of
refugee status.

EU ( 1996), Art. 13: "The clauses in Article I (F) of the Geneva Convention are designed
to exclude from protection under that Convention persons who cannot enjoy
international protection because of the seriousness of the crimes which they have
committed. They may also be applied where the acts become known after the grant of
refugee status ... "
EXCOM82 (1997): "The Executive Committee... [r]eiterates... the need to apply
scrupulously the exclusion clauses stipulated in Article l(F) of the 1951 Convention and
in other relevant instruments, to ensure that the integrity of the asylum institution is not
abused by the extension of protection to those who are not entitled to it."
UNHCR Handbook, para. 141.
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at paras. 3, 25.

11.0l(a) During mass arrivals, the fundamental
humanitarian imperative of preserving life dictates
that asylum initially take precedence over the need
to identify persons mandatorily excluded from
refugee status. It is crucial, however, that the
process of applying the exclusion clauses where
relevant begin as soon as possible.

UNHCR (1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at para. 22.

11.02 The standard of proof required for exclusion
is best stated as "substantially demonstrable
grounds." This implies more than mere suspicion
or conjecture, yet less than proof on a balance of
probabilities. Exclusion may follow even if the
asylum seeker has never been formally charged or
convicted of a criminal offence. Indeed, no
positive or concluded findings are required, so long

UNHCR Handbook, para. 149.
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at para. 4.
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11. "The urovisions of this Convention shall not auuly to any uerson with resuect to whom there are serious reasons for considerin2
that... "
as there are reasoned findings in support of the
application of an exclusion clause.
I 1.03 In view of the serious consequences of a
decision to exclude an individual from refugee
status, care and thorough consideration of all
relevant circumstances under a fair and efficient
procedure is of paramount importance.

EU ( 1996), Art. 13: "In view of the serious consequences of such a decision for the
asylum seeker, Article l(F) must be used with care and after thorough consideration, and
in accordance with the procedures laid down in national law."
UNHCR (1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at paras. 4, 21.
ECRE (2000), at para. 74.

11.04 The exclusion of one member of a family
shall not lead automatically to the exclusion of any
other member of the same family.

ECRE (2000), at para. 80.

11.05 An individual excluded from refugee status
may nonetheless continue to benefit from
protection under other regional or international
norms of human rights law.

UNHCR (1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at para. 6.
ECRE (2000), at para. 75.

-59-

ll(a) " ... (H)e has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime a,:ainst humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes..."
1 l(a).01 A crime against peace consists of
planning, preparing, initiating, or waging war in
violation of international law.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 13.1: "The crimes referred to in Article l(F)(a) are those
defined in international instruments to which the Member States have acceded, and in
resolutions adopted by the United Nations or other international or regional
organizations to the extent that they have been accepted by the Member States."
ECRE (2000), at para. 76

11 (a).02 A war crime consists of a grave breach of
the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949; any
other serious violation of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict; or in the
case of an armed conflict not of an international
character, a serious violation of Art. 3 common to
the four Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 8.

1 l(a).03 A crime against humanity consists of any
of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack: murder; extermination; enslavement;
deportation or forcible transfer of population;
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence
of comparable gravity; enforced disappearance of
persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or to
mental or physical health; and persecution against

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7.
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any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender
or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act independently defined to
be a crime against humanity or otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
l l(a).03(a) The crime of genocide shall also be
considered to be a crime against humanity.
Genocide means any of the following acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,
as such: killing members of the group; causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the
group; and forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 7.

l l(a).04 The personal and knowing involvement of
the individual in an act described in Art. l(F)(a) is
ordinarily a requirement for exclusion from refugee
status.
l l(a).05 An applicant who has committed a crime
defined in Art. l(F)(a) may not invoke superior
orders or prescription by law in order to avoid
exclusion from refugee status unless he or she was

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Arts. 31-33.
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under a legal obligation to obey such orders, did
not know that the order was unlawful, and the order
was not manifestly unlawful. Orders to commit
genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly
unlawful.
l l(a).06 An individual may be excluded under this
clause if he or she was the superior of a person or
group of persons primarily responsible for the
commission of a crime described in Art. l(F)(a).
Exclusion shall follow if the superior knew or
should have known that the subordinate was
committing or intending to commit such a crime,
but failed to take all necessary measures within his
or her power to prevent the commission of the
crime.

Prosecutor v. Dalalic, ICTFY Dec. No. IT-96-21-T, 16 Nov. 1998.

l l(a).07 In interpreting the scope of international
crimes which are grounds for exclusion from
refugee status under Art. l(F)(a), account shall in
particular be taken of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court, and of the
jurisprudence of such general and specialized
international criminal tribunals as may be
established by the United Nations.

UNHCR Handbook, para. 150.

International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, Art. 6.

ECRE (2000), at para. 77.
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ll(b) " ... [Hie has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refuz:ee..."

l l(b).01 Exclusion under Art. l(F)(b) serves two
related purposes. First, it safeguards the principled
right of an asylum State to refuse to admit as a
refugee any person who is a serious fugitive from
justice. Second and related, it ensures that the duty
to protect refugees does not conflict with the
asylum State's extradition obligations. It follows
that for purposes of exclusion under Art. l (F)(b),
only crimes committed outside the State in which
asylum is sought are relevant. Such crimes must be
justiciable, and must meet a high definition of
gravity.
l l(b).02 First, the criminal allegation must be
based on acts committed outside the asylum State,
whether in the country of origin or while in transit
to the State in which asylum is sought. Criminal
activity in the State of refuge, on the other hand, is
appropriately adjudicated through due process of
law, with recourse to expulsion or return under Art.
33(2) if the refugee is consequently found to pose a
risk to public safety or security.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 14(2): "This right [to seek asylum] may not
be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes ..."
ECRE (2000), at para. 78.

UNHCR Handbook, paras. 153-154.
UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at para. 19.

11 (b).03 Second, both rationales for the exclusion
clause require the criminal offence to be justiciable
in the country in which it was committed. Insofar
as the applicant has served his or her sentence,
been acquitted of the charges, benefited from an
amnesty or otherwise met all obligations under the
criminal law of the country where the offence
occurred, he or she would neither have avoided due
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refugee ..."

process, nor be subject to extradition.
11 (b ).04 Third, the offence committed must be one
for which the asylum State would in principle be
prepared to grant extradition. Because there is no
international standard of "serious" common
criminality, each State shall apply its own
definition of extraditable criminality to decide
whether or not the offence is a serious one, subject
to the duty to refrain from applying a standard
clearly outside the realm of customary state
practice.

United Kingdom: T. v. SSHD, 22 May 1996 (HL).

1 l(b).05 In determining whether or not the offence
is so serious that it would ordinarily lead to
extradition, any exceptions the asylum State
normally applies in the consideration of extradition
requests, subject to limits set by the 1996 European
Convention Relating to Extradition between the
Member States and other relevant Community
norms, comprise an integral part of the standard for
exclusion under Art. 1(F)(b ). An assessment of
whether or not an offence is "political" requires
consideration of whether the ends employed were
proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved,
taking the particular context into account.

Compare EU (1996), Art. 13.2: "The severity of the expected persecution is to be
weighed against the nature of the criminal offence of which the person concerned is
suspected. Particularly cruel actions, even if committed with an allegedly political
objective, may be classified as serious non-political crimes. This applies both to the
participants in the crime and to its instigators."

l l(b).06 Concern that a particular asylum seeker
poses a threat to the safety or security of an asylum
state is not grounds for exclusion under Art.
l(F)(b). Refugee status determination shall

Compare UNHCR ( 1995), at para. I 0: "In applying Article 1(F)(b) pertaining to the
commission of a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to
admission, UNHCR has consistently underlined the importance of striking a balance
between the nature of the offence presumed to have been committed by the applicant,
and the degree of persecution feared."
ILPA (2000), at Art. 16(3).
France, Moses Allueke, Conseil d'Etat Dec. No. 188981 (1999); United Kingdom, T. v.
SSHD, 22 May 1996 (HL), per Lord Mustill.
ECRE (2000), at para. 78.
-64-

ll(b} " ... [H)e has committed a serious non-uolitical crime outside the countn of refuge urior to his admission to that countn as a
refugee ..."
proceed in the usual way in such cases. But where
the higher substantive and procedural standards of
Art. 33(2) are met, an asylum State may
nonetheless refuse to protect a refugee whose
presence threatens its most basic interests in safety
and security.
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11(c)

" ... rHle has been vuiltv of acts contrarv to the nurnoses and nrincinles of the United Nations."

1 l(c).01 The principles and purposes of the United
Nations are expressly defined in the United Nations
Charter to include maintenance of international
peace and security; development of friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples; achievement of international cooperation
in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character,
including by respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms; and harmonization of the
actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.

EU (1996), Art. 13 .3: "The purposes and principles referred to in Article 1(F)(c) are in
the first instance those laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, which determines
the obligations of the States party to it in their mutual relations, particularly for the
purpose of maintaining peace, and with regard to human rights and fundamental
freedoms."

1 l(c).02 In addition, where a widely accepted
international agreement declares that the
commission of certain acts is contrary to the
principles and purposes of the UN, then there is a
strong indication that those acts will fall within Art.
l(F)(c).

EU ( 1996), Art. 13 .3: "In order to determine whether an action may be deemed contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, Member States should take account
of the conventions and resolutions adopted in this connection under the auspices of the
United Nations."

l l(c).03 Article l(F)(c) is directed notably at
persons in senior positions in a State or
international organization who, by virtue of their
responsibilities, have ordered or lent their authority
to action at variance with those purposes and
principles, as well as to the members of security
forces who assumed personal responsibility for the
performance of such action.

EU (1996), Art. 13.3: "Article l(F)(c) applies to cases in which those principles have
been breached and is directed notably at persons in senior positions in the State who, by
virtue of their responsibilities, have ordered or lent their authority to action at variance
with those purposes and principles as well as at persons who, as members of the security
forces, have been prompted to assume personal responsibility for the performance of
such action."

ECRE (2000), at paras. 79, 81.

ECRE (2000), at para. 80.

UNHCR Handbook, para. t 63.
UNHCR ( 1997 Note on the Exclusion Clauses), at para. 20.
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France, Duvalier, Conseil d'Etat Dec. No. 81.963 (1992); Netherlands, J.MS., Council
of State Dec. NAY 1993.
ECRE (2000), at para. 79.
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ANNEX I: DRAFT DIRECTIVE

[Preamble]
1. General interpretive principles
1.0 I Member States affirm their commitment to grant asylum to any person who meets the refugee
definition set by Art. I of the United Nations Refugee Convention ( 1951 ), as extended by Art. I of the
Refugee Protocol ( 1967).
1.02 While the requirements of each element of the refugee definition shall be satisfied before asylum is
granted, the elements of the refugee definition do not stand alone. A decision on whether to recognize or to
deny refugee status shall be based on a holistic assessment of the applicability of the refugee definition to
the claim.
1.03 Member States affirm their commitment to the full and inclusive application of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol in accordance with generally accepted standards of treaty interpretation. The
refugee definition shall be interpreted in a positive and humanitarian way, consistent with the objects and
purposes of these instruments.
1.04 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall in particular be informed by the human rights obligations
undertaken by Member States.
1.05 The refugee definition shall be interpreted without discrimination on grounds of nationality, sex, racial
or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, language, political or other opinion,
association with a national minority, birth or other status.
1.06 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall take account of the specific circumstances of women,
children, adolescents, the elderly, and of persons suffering from infirmity, whether mental or physical.

2. The nature of asylum
2.01 The recognition ofrefugee status is a declaratory act. A person is a refugee as soon as he or she
fulfils the criteria contained in the refugee definition. This necessarily occurs prior to the time at which
refugee status is formally recognized.
2.02 Member States shall examine an application for asylum made by any person under their jurisdiction,
subject to Community rules on the responsibility for asylum adjudication and national or Community rules
defining the procedures applicable to examining such an application.
2.03 Member States shall facilitate the duty of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to supervise the application of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. UNHCR shall in
particular be granted meaningful access to all procedures established for the examination of claims to
asylum.
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2.04 The individual seeking recognition ofrefugee status bears the burden of proof to establish primafacie
entitlement to refugee status. The burden of proof to establish cessation of, or exclusion from, refugee
status lies with the State responsible to decide the claim to asylum.
2.05 Notwithstanding formal attribution of the burden of proof, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all
relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the State responsible to decide the claim to asylum.
2.06 Each application for asylum shall be examined on the basis of the facts and circumstances put
forward in each individual case and taking account of the objective situation prevailing in the country of
origin.
2.07 In practice, it may be that a group of people faces the risk of being persecuted for a Convention
reason. In such cases, too, applications shall be examined individually, although in specific cases this
examination may be limited to determining whether the individual is a member of the group in question.
2.08 A decision to suspend consideration of individual asylum applications in the case of a mass influx or
to admit persons to temporary or subsidiary protection under Community or national law shall not
adversely affect the refugee status of a person who otherwise meets the requirements of the refugee
definition.
2.09 A person who is not a refugee may nonetheless be entitled to protection on the basis of other legal
obligations, or to subsidiary protection as defined by Community or national law.

3. " ... (Ils outside the country of his nationality ... [or in the case of a stateless person] of his
former habitual residence ... "
3.01 The claim to asylum of a person who is a citizen of only one country shall be assessed on the basis of
the conditions which prevail in that country.
3.02 The claim to asylum of a person who is a citizen of more than one country shall be assessed on the
basis of the conditions which prevail in each country of citizenship.
3 .03 For purposes of refugee status determination, an individual is a citizen of a country only if he or she is
so recognized by that state at the time of status determination, or if it is established that he or she could
immediately claim and receive the country's citizenship without the interposition of any administrative or
other discretion.
3.04 Citizenship must be more than merely formal. At a minimum, it must entitle the individual concerned
to enter and remain permanently in the territory of the state of citizenship.
3 .05 Statelessness does not entitle a person to asylum. The claim to be a refugee made by a person who is
stateless shall be assessed on the basis of the conditions which prevail in each country where that person
has previously resided. A stateless person is a refugee only if he or she satisfies the requirements of the
refugee definition in relation to at least one country of former habitual residence and cannot return to any
other country of former habitual residence.
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3.0S(a) In practical terms, a stateless person can have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in a
state of former residence only if he or she is able to return to that country.
3.0S(b) A stateless person who is not a refugee may nonetheless be entitled to protection in
accordance with the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954).

4. " ... (O]wing to well-founded fear ... "
4.01 The refugee definition is forward-looking. The relevant question is whether the applicant's fear of
being persecuted in the country of origin (as defined in Part 3) is objectively established.
4.02 The fact that an individual has already been subject to persecution or to direct threats of persecution is
a serious indication of the risk of being persecuted, unless a radical and relevant change of conditions has
taken place since then in the applicant's country of origin, or in his or her relations with the country of
origin.
4.03 The fact that an individual, prior to departure from his or her country of origin, was not subject to
persecution or directly threatened with persecution does not mean that he or she cannot in asylum
proceedings establish a well-founded fear ~f being persecuted in the foreseeable future.
4.04 An individual may be a refugee even though he or she was able to leave the country of origin without
difficulty. Neither the ability to secure a passport or exit permission nor departure without hindrance is
necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a forward-looking well-founded fear of being persecuted.
4.05 Because the refugee definition is concerned to identify risks that would accrue upon the applicant's
return to his or her country of origin, account shall be taken of any risk of being persecuted identifiable at
the moment of refugee status determination, or that may emerge up to the time of removal of an individual
from a state's territory.
4.06 The fear of being persecuted need not have existed when the individual left his or her country of
origin. An individual who did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted at the time of leaving may
subsequently become a refugee sur place. A well-founded fear of being persecuted may be based on
relevant changes in the situation in his or her country of origin, or on his or her own actions.
4.06(a) A sur place claim based on relevant changes in the individual's country of origin since
departure shall be recognized only insofar as those changes are shown to give rise to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted on the part of the individual.
4.06(b) A sur place claim based on the individual's activities since leaving his or her country of
origin is most readily established where the activities relied upon constitute the expression and
continuation of convictions held in the country of origin, and which are related to the grounds for
recognition ofrefugee status. Continuity of this kind is not an absolute requirement, however, and
shall in particular not be insisted upon where the individual's age, infirmity, or other circumstances
make the expectation of continuity unreasonable. Nor is continuity required where the actions
relied upon are objectively regarded as the genuine expression or consequence of one of the
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grounds for recognition of refugee status. If, however, it is clear that the activities since leaving
the country of origin were engaged in for the purpose of creating the necessary conditions for being
admitted to asylum, the activities do not in principle furnish grounds for the recognition of refugee
status. Activities of this kind may be the basis for a grant of asylum only if they may reasonably
be expected to come to the notice of the authorities of the individual's country of origin, be treated
by them as demonstrative of an adverse political or other protected opinion or characteristic, and
give rise to a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
4.07 A fear of being persecuted is well-founded even if there is not a clear probability that the individual
will be persecuted. On the other hand, the mere chance or remote possibility of being persecuted is an
insufficient basis for the recognition ofrefugee status. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a significant
risk that the individual may be persecuted.
4.07(a) In keeping with the commitment to a holistic interpretation of the refugee definition, a more
generous approach to application of the significant risk standard is called for where the persecution
threatened is particularly grave, for example a threat to life or physical security.
4.08 All material evidence, whatever its weight, shall be taken into account in reaching a decision as to
whether or not an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
4.09 In many cases, the primary evidence adduced by the applicant for asylum will be his or her own
testimony. A determination that an applicant's testimony is not credible shall be based on specific, cogent
concerns about the veracity of testimony offered on a material point. In the case of uncertainty, the
applicant shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
4.09(a) Reasonable efforts shall be made to corroborate the applicant's testimony. Once the
credibility of the testimony on material points is established, however, it will not be necessary to
seek detailed confirmation of the facts put forward.
4.09(b) Children and mentally disabled persons may have different ways of communicating their
concerns and different knowledge of their predicament than is reasonable to expect of a mentally
able adult. A generous margin of appreciation shall therefore be applied to assessment of the
credibility of their testimony.
4.09(c) Where an applicant testifies through an interpreter, efforts shall be made to select qualified
and neutral interpreters, to ask questions which are neither vague nor ambiguous, and to ensure the
accuracy of an interpreted answer which is unclear or inconsistent with other material evidence.
4.09(d) The credibility of an applicant shall not be called into question solely on the grounds of his
or her illegal entry or use false travel documents, so long as a reasonable explanation is provided
for such actions.
4.09(e) The testimony of an applicant may be credible even though it is similar to that given by
other applicants for asylum. An applicant shall not be suspected of fabricating his or her claim
simply because it is similar to those made by other persons, so long as the applicant is able to
provide a detailed account of the elements of his or her personal experience relevant to
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determination of the asylum claim.
4.O9(f) The testimony of an applicant may be credible even though it is different from that given by
other applicants for asylum from the same country or with a similar background.
4.O9(g) Inconsistency, misrepresentation, or concealment by the applicant on a point material to the
claim to refugee status shall ordinarily lead to a finding that his or her testimony is not credible.
4.10 Where the applicant's testimony is found not to be credible on a material point, asylum shall
nonetheless be granted if there is credible evidence of another kind which establishes entitlement to refugee
status.
4.11 The risk of being persecuted need not be in any sense unique to the applicant for asylum. Asylum
may be granted where it is established by reference to credible human rights reports or the credible
testimony of other persons that a relevant group in the country of origin faces a significant risk of being
persecuted, and that the applicant is a member of that group.
4.12 An application for asylum may also be based on credible evidence that laws or regulations in force in
the country of origin authorize or condone the persecution of the applicant as an individual, or of a relevant
group of which the applicant is shown to be a member. Asylum may be granted in such cases where the
existence and purport of the laws or regulations are credibly established, and it is determined that there is a
significant risk of their application in practice.
4.13 The well-founded nature of a fear of being persecuted is not compromised solely by the failure of the
applicant first to seek protection from another State, or because the claim to asylum was not made at the
earliest possible opportunity.

5. " ... [O]f being persecuted ... "
5.01 Persecution is the sustained or systemic deprivation of State protection against the risk of serious and
unjustified infliction of harm.
5.02 A deprivation of State protection is most clearly evident where the threat of serious and unjustified
harm emanates from the State itself, or from parties or organizations controlling the State. This includes
threats made by agents of the national government, or by the agents ofregional, local, or other public
authorities to which the national government is unable or unwilling effectively to respond.
5.03 There is also a deprivation of State protection where the national government is unable or unwilling
effectively to respond to threats of serious and unjustified harm which emanate from non-state actors. In
such cases, however, an applicant for asylum shall demonstrate that he or she has made all reasonable
efforts to secure the protection of the national government, or that such efforts would be manifestly unlikely
to succeed.
5.04 The risk that ensues from the deprivation of State protection must be serious and unjustified. This
means that it must either constitute a basic attack on internationally recognized human rights, or in the light
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of all the facts of the case manifestly preclude the applicant from returning to his or her country of origin.
5.05 The seriousness of harm is not to be determined in the abstract, but shall take account of both the
degree of risk faced and any particular vulnerabilities of the applicant for asylum
5.05(a) Where the applicant for asylum is a child or adolescent, the assessment of whether a given
risk is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution shall take account of child-specific forms of
human rights violation, and be guided by the international commitment to promote the best interests
of the child.
5.05(b) Where the applicant for asylum is a woman, account shall be taken of the fact that
persecution may be effected through sexual violence or other gender-specific means.
5.06 Persecution may take the form of administrative and/or judicial measures which either have the
appearance of legality and are misused for the purposes of persecution, or are carried out in breach of the
law.
5.07 General measures to safeguard public order, State security, or public health will not usually amount to
persecution. However, where the measures taken or proposed restrict the exercise of internationally
recognized human rights, they must meet the requirements for valid limitation of or derogation from human
rights obligations established by international law, including the duty to ensure that any exceptional
measures are proportionate to the risks faced, and are imposed and implemented without discrimination.
Where the requirements for lawful limitation or derogation are not met, a harm of sufficient gravity
resulting from such a purported exercise of exceptional authority shall ordinarily justify a finding of a risk
of being persecuted.
5.08 Criminal prosecution or punishment for breach of an ordinary law of general application will not
usually amount to persecution. It may be otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages in
discriminatory prosecution or adjudication; if it imposes discriminatory punishment; or if its law purports
to criminalize the exercise of a basic international human right or to require an individual to commit acts
which are in violation of basic norms of international law. A harm of sufficient gravity resulting from such
a purported exercise of criminal law authority is a form of persecution.
5.08(a) Discriminatory prosecution occurs when a criminal law provision is in principle applicable
to all, but is unjustifiably enforced against only certain persons or groups of persons.
5.08(b) Discriminatory adjudication occurs when a criminal law provision is enforced by means of
a process which unjustifiably denies certain persons or groups of persons the procedural and other
rights extended to the population at large.
5.08(c) Discriminatory punishment occurs when the penalty for breach of a generally applicable
criminal law is more severe for certain persons or groups of persons.
5.08(d) The legitimate scope of a State's criminal law authority is circumscribed by basic norms of
international human rights law. Subject to any express rules authorizing derogation from human
rights obligations, penalties of sufficient gravity imposed for the exercise of a basic international
human right shall ordinarily justify a finding of a risk of being persecuted.
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5. 08( e) A penalty of sufficient gravity imposed for failure or refusal to engage in any act within the
scope of the exclusion clauses set out in Art. 1(F) of the Refugee Convention amounts to
persecution.
5.09 Prosecution or punishment for refusal to meet a general obligation to perform military service
(whether for conscientious objection, absence without leave, evasion, or desertion) will not usually amount
to persecution. It may be otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages in discriminatory conscription;
assigns duties or conditions of service on a discriminatory basis; imposes sanctions for failure to meet
military service obligations on a discriminatory basis; seeks to require participation in military activities in
breach of international law; or fails to provide a reasonable and non-discriminatory alternative to military
service for persons with genuine political, religious, or moral convictions to military service. A harm of
sufficient gravity resulting from such a purported exercise of authority to require military service shall
ordinarily justify a finding of a risk of being persecuted.
5.10 Persecution may arise from a combination of circumstances which would not amount to persecution if
considered separately.

6. " ... [Flor reasons of race, religion. nationality. membership of a particular social group or political
opinion ... "
6.01 Not every person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted is a refugee. Unless the risk faced
by the applicant can be linked to at least one of the five grounds enumerated in the Convention - race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion - the claim to asylum is
not established.
6.02 It is not sufficient that an applicant is a person defined by a Convention ground and also has a wellfounded fear of being persecuted. There must be a causal connection between these two elements of the
definition.
6.03 The causal connection required is between a Convention ground and the applicant's well-founded fear
of "being persecuted." Because it is the asylum-seeker's predicament which must be based on a
Convention ground, the duty to show a causal connection is met when either the threat of harm or the
withholding of effective state protection is based on a Convention ground.
6.04 A fear of being persecuted is for reasons of a Convention ground whether it is experienced as an
individual, or as part of a group.
6.05 The "for reasons of' requirement does not require the applicant for asylum or the group of which he
or she is a part to be more at risk than other persons or groups in the country of origin. The relevant
question is instead whether the Convention ground is causally connected to the applicant's predicament,
irrespective of whether other individuals or groups also face a well-founded fear of being persecuted for the
same or a different Convention ground.
6.06 The Convention ground need not account for the entirety of the risk of being persecuted, nor even be
its primary cause. It must, however, be an appreciable explanatory factor. If the Convention ground is no
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more than remotely connected to the well-founded fear of being persecuted, refugee status need not be
recognized.
6.07 The requisite causal connection between the applicant's predicament and a Convention ground may
be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
6.08 Asylum seekers who come from a country in which many or all persons face the risk of generalized
oppression or violence are nonetheless entitled to be recognized as refugees if their race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion accounts for an appreciable part
of their well-founded fear of being persecuted. If, on the other hand, the risk established by the applicant is
not causally connected in some appreciable way to a Convention ground, refugee status shall not be
recognized.
6.09 Persons in flight from civil war or internal or generalized armed conflict are not necessarily
Convention refugees, but neither are they automatically excluded from refugee status. A well-founded fear
of being persecuted may arise in a situation of war, particularly where war or violence is a means of
carrying out a persecutory policy against one or more groups defined by race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; or where the State withholds its protection
from an individual or group for a Convention reason.
6.10 It is not the duty of the applicant accurately to identify the reason he or she has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted. The State determining the claim to asylum shall decide which, if any, Convention ground
is causally connected to the applicant's predicament.
6.11 The various Convention grounds frequently overlap. It is immaterial whether the well-founded fear
of being persecuted arises from any single one of these grounds or from a combination of two or more of
them. It may also be the case that the risk of being persecuted arises only when two or more Convention
grounds combine in the same person, in which case the combination of such grounds is the basis for the
well-founded fear of being persecuted.
6.12 The fact that the grounds are genuine or simply attributed to the applicant by the State or nongovernmental agent of persecution is immaterial.
6.13 An individual shall not be expected to deny his or her identity or beliefs in order to avoid coming to
the attention of the State or non-governmental agent of persecution. The relevant inquiry is whether the
State or non-governmental agent of persecution is aware, or could reasonably be expected to become
aware, of the applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.
6.14 Care shall be taken not to confuse the reason an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted with the form which that persecution may take. In particular, a woman or girl may face the risk
of a gender-specific form of persecution on the grounds of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership of a particular social group.
6.15 "Race" includes the full range of sociological understandings of race, including those based on
colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin.
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6.16 "Religion" includes the holding of, or failure to hold, any belief. It also includes participation in, or
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other
religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by
any religious belief.
6.16(a) An applicant who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason of conscientious
objection to military service may qualify for refugee status on the grounds of religion.
6.17 "Nationality" includes citizenship or the lack thereof, as well as membership of a group defined by its
cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins, or its relationship with the
population of another State.
6.18 "Political opinion" includes an opinion on a matter on which the machinery of state, government, or
policy may be engaged, whether or not that opinion has been acted upon by the applicant. The political
nature of an opinion is not compromised by the objective unimportance of the applicant's opinions or
relevant actions, or by his or her own failure or unwillingness to characterize the opinion as political.
6.18(a) In particular, a refusal to engage in or to support activities contrary to international law is
a form of political opinion.
6.19 "Membership of a particular social group" is an open-ended concept which comprises affiliation with
any group comprised of persons who share a common characteristic which is fundamental to identity or
conscience. The group may be defined by an immutable characteristic (such as sex or gender, sexual
orientation, age, family relationship, or history) or by an attribute which is so fundamental to identity or
conscience that members of the group should not be required to renounce it (such as trade union
membership or the advocacy of human rights). The concept is not confined to narrowly defined, small
groups of persons, and no voluntary associational relationship or de facto cohesion of members is required.
6. l 9(a) While susceptibility to persecution may give visibility to a particular social group, the
group must nonetheless exist and be defined independently of the well-founded fear of being
persecuted.

7. " ... [A]nd is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country: or who, not having a nationality ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it."
7.01 Refugee status shall be recognized only in the case of a person who is either unable or legitimately
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the country of origin's protection against the significant risk of being
persecuted. This requirement is met if:
7.0l(a) The state of origin is the direct or indirect agent of persecution.
7.0l(b) The state of origin is unwilling effectively to protect the asylum seeker from being
persecuted.
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7.01 (c) The state of origin is not capable of effectively responding to the risk of being persecuted.
In this case, however, the asylum seeker shall demonstrate that he or she has made all reasonable
efforts to secure the protection of the national government of the state of origin, or that such efforts
would be manifestly unlikely to succeed.
7.02 Where it appears that the risk of being persecuted is clearly confined to a specific part of the territory
of the country of origin, the requirement that a refugee be " ... unable or, owing to such fear ( of being
persecuted), is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" authorizes an inquiry to
determine whether the person concerned can find effective State protection in another part of his or her own
country, to which he or she may reasonably be returned.
7 .03 The relevant inquiry is not whether an applicant might have avoided departure from her or his
country of origin. Nor is it an assessment of whether the risk of being persecuted can presently be avoided
somewhere inside the asylum seeker's country of origin.
7 .04 Analysis shall be directed to the identification of asylum seekers who do not require international
protection because they can presently access meaningful protection of their country in a part of that
country's territory. Where a careful inquiry determines that a particular asylum seeker has access to
internal protection, refugee status shall be denied.
7 .05 Consideration of the possibility of denying refugee status on internal protection grounds shall take
place only once it is determined that the applicant otherwise has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
a Convention reason. This is because the reality of access to internal protection can only be adequately
measured on the basis of an understanding of the precise risks faced by the applicant.
7 .06 The State determining the claim to asylum shall in all cases establish a prima facie case that a
particular region of the country of origin meets the internal protection criteria set out below. Once such a
case has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for asylum to demonstrate why the criteria
are not satisfied.
7.07 First, a present possibility of meaningful protection inside the State of origin exists only if the
applicant can be returned to the internal region adjudged to satisfy the criteria for internal protection. A
refugee claim shall not be denied on internal protection grounds where there is evidence that the State
assessing the claim cannot legally, safely, and practically return the asylum seeker to the site of internal
protection.
7.08 Second, there must be no significant risk that the agent of persecution will be present in the designated
place of internal protection in the foreseeable future. Because refugee status assessment requires a forwardlooking assessment of risk, it is not enough simply to find that the original agent of persecution has not yet
established a presence in the proposed site of internal protection.
7.08(a) Because a national government is presumed to be entitled to act throughout the whole of
the national territory, there is a strong presumption against finding internal protection to be
available if the agent of persecution is, or is sponsored by, the national government. Internal
protection is most likely to prove viable when the harm is threatened by a non-state agent.
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7.09 Third, there must be no well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason ofreturn to the proposed site
of internal protection. This determination shall be made on the basis of sound knowledge and evaluation of
the prevailing security, political and social conditions in that part of the country.
7.09(a) This means that the original well-founded fear of being persecuted must not simply be
replaced by a new or different risk of being persecuted.
7 .09(b) It also means that there must be no foreseeable prospect of indirect refoulement to the
region in which a well-founded fear of being persecuted has been found to exist. In assessing the
risk of indirect refoulement, account shall be taken of the intensity of the harms specific to the
proposed site of internal protection (such as, for example, famine or sustained conflict). Where
these rise to a particularly high level, albeit perhaps not amounting to a risk of being persecuted, an
asylum seeker may in practice feel compelled to abandon the proposed site of protection, even if
the only alternative is return to a known risk of being persecuted elsewhere in the country of origin.
7.10 Fourth, because the denial ofrefugee status is predicated not simply on the absence of a risk of being
persecuted, but more fundamentally on the availability of internal protection, there must be evidence that
the applicant's own State can and will provide meaningful protection to him or her in the proposed site of
internal protection. Internal protection requires not only that the applicant be protected against the risk of
being persecuted, but also that he or she enjoy protection there, including respect for human rights and
access to basic public services on terms of equality with other persons living in the site of internal
protection.
7.1 0(a) In determining whether the applicant's own State can and will provide meaningful
protection, the stability of that country and of its national government shall be taken into account.
7 .1 0(b) Because it is access to "the protection of that country" that provides the rationale for
denying asylum on internal protection grounds, the possibility of returning an applicant to a region
controlled by a non-state entity is not a basis for denying refugee status.

8. "This Convention shall cease to apply to any person if. .. "
8.01 Once a person's status as a refugee has been determined, it is maintained until and unless he or she
comes within the terms of one of the cessation clauses in Art. l(C) of the Refugee Convention. The
cessation clauses are exhaustive. This strict approach provides refugees with the assurance that their status
will not be subject to constant review, and that any decision to bring refugee status to an end will be based
on clearly stated standards.
8.02 In principle, application of the cessation clauses is declaratory, acknowledging that international
refugee protection is no longer required. It operates to withdraw refugee status, and brings to an end
entitlement to the rights associated with refugee status.
8.03 The State of asylum bears the burden of proof to establish that an individual has ceased to be a
refugee for a reason stipulated in Art. l (C). A decision to withdraw refugee status shall be based on
objective and verifiable evidence, and shall always be investigated on an individual basis. The refugee shall
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have the opportunity to contest the application of Art. l(C).
8.04 A State invoking a cessation clause shall deal humanely with affected individuals or groups, and in
particular shall facilitate their return to the country of origin in a fair and dignified manner.

8(a) "He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his nationality ... "
S(a).01 A refugee who voluntarily seeks and obtains from the authorities of his or her country of origin a
form of diplomatic protection available only to nationals of that country, such as the issuance or renewal of
a national passport, may thereby cease to be a refugee. For this to be so, however, the refugee must
specifically intend by the action to re-avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
S(a).02 Where the contact between a refugee and the diplomatic mission of his or her country of origin is
incidental, it is unlikely to evince the requisite intention to secure that State's protection.
S(a).03 A refugee who seeks and obtains diplomatic protection from his or her country of origin on the
instructions of authorities of an asylum State cannot be said to have acted voluntarily.

8(b) "Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it..."
8(b).01 A refugee who has lost the nationality of his or her country of origin, and who voluntarily seeks
and receives again the nationality of that State, thereby ceases to be a refugee. The re-acquisition of
nationality de jure alone is insufficient to justify application of the cessation clause. Voluntary reacquisition of former nationality must be accompanied by the actual restoration of relations between the
individual and the country of nationality.
8(b).0l(a) The granting of nationality by operation of law or by decree does not amount to
voluntary re-acquisition of nationality, unless the nationality has been expressly or impliedly
accepted by the refugee.

8(c) "He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new
nationality ... "
8(c).0 I Because an individual who enjoys national protection is not in need of international protection,
refugee status is lost upon acquisition of a new and effective nationality. The acquisition of nationality de
jure alone is insufficient to justify application of the cessation clause. Acquisition of nationality must be
accompanied by the actual establishment of relations between the individual and the country of nationality.
8(c).0l(a) In particular, an individual cannot be said to enjoy protection as a national unless he or
she is entitled to enter the territory of the State of nationality, and to reside there indefinitely with
protection against deportation or expulsion.
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8(c).02 An individual who ceases to be a refugee by operation of this clause is not precluded from seeking
asylum anew on the grounds that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the new country
of nationality.
8(c).03 Where refugee status has come to an end by virtue of the acquisition of a new nationality, and the
new nationality is subsequently lost, refugee status may be revived, depending on the circumstances.

8(d) "He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside of which he
has remained owing to fear of persecution ... "
8(d).01 Voluntary re-establishment in the country of origin is perhaps the clearest evidence that a refugee
does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in that country. A refugee who returns to his or her
country of origin with a view to residing there on an ongoing basis thereby ceases to be a refugee.
8(d).02 Voluntary re-establishment shall not, however, be equated with voluntary return to the country of
origin for serious reasons on a short-term, strictly temporary basis.
8( d).03 A consistent pattern of regular return visits to the country of origin may nonetheless over time
amount to re-establishment in that country. This is particularly so if the refugee avails himself or herself of
the benefits and facilities in the country normally enjoyed by citizens.
8( d).04 A person whose right to asylum has been recognized shall retain that status for a period of at least
six months after departure from the State which recognized that status, if such departure is authorized by
the asylum State and is made for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not conditions in the country of
origin have improved sufficiently to enable the resumption of permanent residence there.

8(e) "He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection
of the country of his nationality ... [or in the case of a stateless refugee, he is] able to return to the
country of his former habitual residence ..."
8(e).01 Refugee status comes to an end if and when a change of circumstances in a refugee's country of
origin is of such a profound and durable nature that it eliminates the refugee's well-founded fear of being
persecuted.
8(e).02 A profound change of circumstances is not the same as an improvement in conditions in the country
of origin. The relevant inquiry is whether there has been a fundamental change of substantial political or
social significance which has produced a stable power structure different from that under which the original
well-founded fear of being persecuted was produced. A complete political change is the most obvious
example of a profound change of circumstances, although the holding of democratic elections, declaration
of an amnesty, repeal of oppressive laws, or dismantling of former security services may also be evidence
of such a transition.

-Xlll-

8(e ).03 A profound change of circumstances may be said to be durable only after the State of asylum has
carefully monitored conditions in the country of origin for a reasonable period of time. A situation which
has changed, but which also continues to show signs of volatility, is by definition not durable. There must
be objective and verifiable evidence that human rights are generally respected in that country, and in
particular that the factors which gave rise to the refugee's well-founded fear of being persecuted are
durably suppressed or eliminated. Practical developments such as organized repatriation and the
experience of returnees, as well as the reports of independent observers shall be given considerable weight.

8(e).03(a) While there can be no firm rule about how long assessment of a profound change of
circumstances should continue before it may reasonably be said to be durable, scrutiny over at
least 12-18 months will usually be required. Where the change takes place peacefully under a
constitutional and democratic process, an assessment of durable change may often be made within
a relatively short time. On the other hand, change which takes place in a violent environment or in
the context of an ongoing process of national reconciliation may call for a more prolonged period
of assessment.
8(e).04 While in some cases general evidence will warrant a presumption in favour of cessation of status
for a group of similarly situated refugees, each individual refugee affected shall be afforded the
opportunity for an examination of circumstances relevant to his or her individual case.
8(e).05 The State invoking this cessation clause shall consider an appropriate status, preserving previously
acquired rights, for persons who have compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to
re-avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin.

9. "This Convention shall not a1;mly to persons who are at present receiving from organs or
agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
protection or assistance. When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason without
the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the
benefits of this Convention."
9.01 An individual who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason, but who is at
present benefiting from the protection or assistance of a United Nations agency (other than that of the
UNHCR) is excluded from refugee status.
9.02 For purposes of this clause, the protection or assistance available from the United Nations agency
must have the effect of eliminating or durably suppressing the individual's well-founded fear of being
persecuted.
9.03 An individual is excluded from refugee status on grounds of United Nations protection or assistance
only if he or she has received such protection or assistance before seeking asylum, and has not at any time
ceased to receive such protection or assistance.
9.04 Exclusion under this clause shall not occur if an individual is prevented by circumstances beyond his
or her control from returning to the place in which he or she is in principle entitled to benefit from United
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Nations protection or assistance.
9.05 Any person who is excluded from refugee status by operation of this clause shall automatically be
entitled to recognition as a refugee at such time as the protection or assistance afforded by the relevant
United Nations agency may for any reason cease without definitive resolution by the General Assembly of
the concerns of the protected population.

10. "This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities
of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights of the nationality of that
country."
10.01 Only an individual who has "taken residence" in a State in which he or she has no well-founded fear
of being persecuted shall be excluded under this clause. Mere transient or purely temporary presence in
such a State is not a basis for exclusion.
10.02 An individual shall be excluded only if he or she is effectively assimilated to the citizens of the State
of residence for purposes of human rights protection and, in particular, is guaranteed full protection against
deportation or expulsion.
10.03 Whatever rights an individual once enjoyed, the applicability of Art. l(E) shall be decided on the
basis of the situation existing at the date of the assessment of refugee status.

11. "The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there
are serious reasons for considering that ... "
11.01 To ensure that the integrity of the institution of asylum is not undermined, no person defined in Art.
l(F) of the Convention may under any circumstance be recognized as a refugee. Exclusion shall also occur
where the facts requiring exclusion become known after the recognition of refugee status.
1 l.0l(a) During mass arrivals, the fundamental humanitarian imperative of preserving life dictates
that asylum initially take precedence over the need to identify persons mandatorily excluded from
refugee status. It is crucial, however, that the process of applying the exclusion clauses where
relevant begin as soon as possible.
11.02 The standard of proofrequired for exclusion is best stated as "substantially demonstrable grounds."
This implies more than mere suspicion or conjecture, yet less than proof on a balance of probabilities.
Exclusion may follow even if the asylum seeker has never been formally charged or convicted of a criminal
offence. Indeed, no positive or concluded findings are required, so long as there are reasoned findings in
support of the application of an exclusion clause.
11.03 In view of the serious consequences of a decision to exclude an individual from refugee status, care
and thorough consideration of all relevant circumstances under a fair and efficient procedure is of
paramount importance.

-xv-

11.04 The exclusion of one member of a family shall not lead automatically to the exclusion of any other
member of the same family.
11.05 An individual excluded from refugee status may nonetheless continue to benefit from protection
under other regional or international norms of human rights law.

l l(a) " ... [H]e has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes ... "
l l(a).01 A crime against peace consists of planning, preparing, initiating, or waging war in violation of
international law.
l l(a).02 A war crime consists of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949; any other
serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict; or in the case of an
armed conflict not of an international character, a serious violation of Art. 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949.
l l(a).03 A crime against humanity consists of any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane
acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health; and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act independently defined to be a crime against humanity or
otherwise within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
l l(a).03(a) The crime of genocide shall also be considered to be a crime against humanity.
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
l l(a).04 The personal and knowing involvement of the individual in an act described in Art. l(F)(a) is
ordinarily a requirement for exclusion from refugee status.
l l(a).05 An applicant who has committed a crime defined in Art. l(F)(a) may not invoke superior orders or
prescription by law in order to avoid exclusion from refugee status unless he or she was under a legal
obligation to obey such orders, did not know that the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly
unlawful. Orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
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l l(a).06 An individual may be excluded under this clause ifhe or she was the superior of a person or group
of persons primarily responsible for the commission of a crime described in Art. l(F)(a). Exclusion shall
follow if the superior knew or should have known that the subordinate was committing or intending to
commit such a crime, but failed to take all necessary measures within his or her power to prevent the
commission of the crime.
l l(a).07 In interpreting the scope of international crimes which are grounds for exclusion from refugee
status under Art. l(F)(a), account shall in particular be taken of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, and of the jurisprudence of such general and specialized international criminal tribunals as may be
established by the United Nations.

1 l(b) " ... [H]e has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country ofrefuge prior to

his admission to that country as a refugee ... "
l l(b).01 Exclusion under Art. l(F)(b) serves two related purposes. First, it safeguards the principled right
of an asylum State to refuse to admit as a refugee any person who is a serious fugitive from justice.
Second and related, it ensures that the duty to protect refugees does not conflict with the asylum State's
extradition obligations. It follows that for purposes of exclusion under Art. 1(F)(b ), only crimes committed
outside the State in which asylum is sought are relevant. Such crimes must be justiciable, and must meet a
high definition of gravity.
1 l(b).02 First, the criminal allegation must be based on acts committed outside the asylum State, whether
in the country of origin or while in transit to the State in which asylum is sought. Criminal activity in the
State of refuge, on the other hand, is appropriately adjudicated through due process of law, with recourse to
expulsion or return under Art. 33(2) if the refugee is consequently found to pose a risk to public safety or
security.
1 l(b).03 Second, both rationales for the exclusion clause require the criminal offence to be justiciable in
the country in which it was committed. Insofar as the applicant has served his or her sentence, been
acquitted of the charges, benefited from an amnesty or otherwise met all obligations under the criminal law
of the country where the offence occurred, he or she would neither have avoided due process, nor be subject
to extradition.
l l(b).04 Third, the offence committed must be one for which the asylum State would in principle be
prepared to grant extradition. Because there is no international standard of "serious" common criminality,
each State shall apply its own definition of extraditable criminality to decide whether or not the offence is a
serious one, subject to the duty to refrain from applying a standard clearly outside the realm of customary
state practice.
11 (b ).05 In determining whether or not the offence is so serious that it would ordinarily lead to extradition,
any exceptions the asylum State normally applies in the consideration of extradition requests, subject to
limits set by the 1996 European Convention Relating to Extradition between the Member States and other
relevant Community norms, comprise an integral part of the standard for exclusion under Art. l(F)(b). An
assessment of whether or not an offence is "political" requires consideration of whether the ends employed
were proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved, taking the particular context into account.
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1 l(b).06 Concern that a particular asylum seeker poses a threat to the safety or security of an asylum state
is not grounds for exclusion under Art. 1(F)(b ). Refugee status determination shall proceed in the usual
way in such cases. But where the higher substantive and procedural standards of Art. 33(2) are met, an
asylum State may nonetheless refuse to protect a refugee whose presence threatens its most basic interests
in safety and security.

1 l(c) " ... [H]e has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations."
1l(c).01 The principles and purposes of the United Nations are expressly defined in the United Nations
Charter to include maintenance of international peace and security; development of friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural,
or humanitarian character, including by respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and
harmonization of the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
1 l(c).02 In addition, where a widely accepted international agreement declares that the commission of
certain acts is contrary to the principles and purposes of the UN, then there is a strong indication that those
acts will fall within Art. 1(F)(c).
1 l(c).03 Article l(F)(c) is directed notably at persons in senior positions in a State or international
organization who, by virtue of their responsibilities, have ordered or lent their authority to action at
variance with those purposes and principles, as well as to the members of security forces who assumed
personal responsibility for the performance of such action.
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ANNEX Il: DRAFT DIRECTIVE (ABBREVIATED VERSION)

[Preamble]
1. General interpretive principles
1.0 I Member States affirm their commitment to grant asylum to any person who meets the refugee
definition set by Art. 1 of the United Nations Refugee Convention (1951), as extended by Art. I of the
Refugee Protocol ( 1967).
1.02 While the requirements of each element of the refugee definition shall be satisfied before asylum is
granted, a decision on whether to recognize or to deny refugee status shall be based on a holistic assessment
of the applicability of the refugee definition to the claim.
1.03 Member States affirm their commitment to the full and inclusive application of the Refugee
Convention and Protocol in accordance with generally accepted standards of treaty interpretation.
1.04 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall in particular be informed by the human rights obligations
undertaken by Member States.
1.05 The refugee definition shall be interpreted without discrimination.
1.06 Interpretation of the refugee definition shall take account of the specific circumstances of women,
children, adolescents, the elderly, and of persons suffering from infirmity, whether mental or physical.

2. The nature of asylum
2.01 The recognition of refugee status is a declaratory act.
2.02 Member States shall examine an application for asylum made by any person under their jurisdiction,
subject to Community rules on the responsibility for asylum adjudication and national or Community rules
defining the procedures applicable to examining such an application.
2.03 Member States shall facilitate the duty of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to supervise the application of the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
2.04 The individual seeking recognition ofrefugee status bears the burden of proof to establishprimafacie
entitlement to refugee status. The burden of proof to establish cessation of, or exclusion from, refugee
status lies with the State responsible to decide the claim to asylum.
2.05 Notwithstanding formal attribution of the burden of proof, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all
relevant facts is shared between the applicant and the State responsible to decide the claim to asylum.
2.06 Each application for asylum shall be examined on the basis of the facts and circumstances put
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forward in each individual case and taking account of the objective situation prevailing in the country of
origin.
2.07 In practice, it may be that a group of people faces the risk of being persecuted for a Convention
reason. In such cases, too, applications shall be examined individually, although in specific cases this
examination may be limited to detennining whether the individual is a member of the group in question.
2.08 A decision to suspend consideration of individual asylum applications in the case of a mass influx or
to admit persons to temporary or subsidiary protection under Community or national law shall not
adversely affect the refugee status of a person who otherwise meets the requirements of the refugee
definition.

3. " ... [I]s outside the country of his nationality ... [or in the case of a stateless person] of his
former habitual residence ... "
3.01 The claim to asylum of a person who is a citizen of only one country shall be assessed on the basis of
the conditions which prevail in that country.
3 .02 The claim to asylum of a person who is a citizen of more than one country shall be assessed on the
basis of the conditions which prevail in each country of citizenship.
3 .03 Statelessness does not entitle a person to asylum. The claim to be a refugee made by a person who is
stateless shall be assessed on the basis of the conditions which prevail in each country where that person
has previously resided. A stateless person is a refugee only ifhe or she satisfies the requirements of the
refugee definition in relation to at least one country of fonner habitual residence and cannot return to any
other country of former habitual residence.

4. " ... [O]wing to well-founded fear ... "
4.01 The refugee definition is forward-looking. The relevant question is whether the applicant's fear of
being persecuted in the country of origin (as defined in Part 3) is objectively established.
4.02 The fact that an individual has already been subject to persecution or to direct threats of persecution is
a serious indication of the risk of being persecuted.
4.03 The fact that an individual, prior to departure from his or her country of origin, was not subject to
persecution or directly threatened with persecution does not mean that he or she cannot in asylum
proceedings establish a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the foreseeable future.
4.04 An individual may be a refugee even though he or she was able to leave the country of origin without
difficulty.
4.05 Because the refugee definition is concerned to identify risks that would accrue upon the applicant's
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return to his or her country of origin, account shall be taken of any risk of being persecuted identifiable at
the moment of refugee status determination, or that may emerge up to the time of removal of an individual
from a state's territory.
4.06 The fear of being persecuted need not have existed when the individual left his or her country of
origin. An individual who did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted at the time of leaving may
subsequently become a refugee sur place. A well-founded fear of being persecuted may be based on
relevant changes in the situation in his or her country of origin, or on his or her own actions.
4.07 A fear of being persecuted is well-founded even if there is not a clear probability that the individual
will be persecuted. On the other hand, the mere chance or remote possibility of being persecuted is an
insufficient basis for the recognition of refugee status. The relevant inquiry is whether there is a significant
risk that the individual may be persecuted.
4.08 All material evidence, whatever its weight, shall be taken into account in reaching a decision as to
whether or not an asylum seeker has a well-founded fear of being persecuted.
4.09 In many cases, the primary evidence adduced by the applicant for asylum will be his or her own
testimony. A determination that an applicant's testimony is not credible shall be based on specific, cogent
concerns about the veracity of testimony offered on a material point. In the case of uncertainty, the
applicant shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
4.10 Where the applicant's testimony is found not to be credible on a material point, asylum shall
nonetheless be granted if there is credible evidence of another kind which establishes entitlement to refugee
status.
4.11 The risk of being persecuted need not be in any sense unique to the applicant for asylum. Asylum
may be granted where it is established by reference to credible human rights reports or the credible
testimony of other persons that a relevant group in the country of origin faces a significant risk of being
persecuted, and that the applicant is a member of that group.

4.12 An application for asylum may also be based on credible evidence that laws or regulations in
force in the country of origin authorize or condone the persecution of the applicant as an
individual, or of a relevant group of which the applicant is shown to be a member.
4.13 The well-founded nature of a fear of being persecuted is not compromised solely by the failure of the
applicant first to seek protection from another State, or because the claim to asylum was not made at the
earliest possible opportunity.

5. " ... [O]fbeing persecuted... "
5.01 Persecution is the sustained or systemic deprivation of State protection against the risk of
serious and unjustified infliction of harm.
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5.02 A deprivation of State protection is most clearly evident where the threat of serious and
unjustified harm emanates from the State itself, or from parties or organizations controlling the
State.
5.03 There is also a deprivation of State protection where the national government is unable or unwilling
effectively to respond to threats of serious and unjustified harm which emanate from non-state actors. In
such cases, however, an applicant for asylum shall demonstrate that he or she has made all reasonable
efforts to secure the protection of the national government, or that such efforts would be manifestly unlikely
to succeed.
5.04 The risk that ensues from the deprivation of State protection must be serious and unjustified. This
means that it must either constitute a basic attack on internationally recognized human rights, or in the light
of all the facts of the case manifestly preclude the applicant from returning to his or her country of origin.
5.05 The seriousness of harm is not to be determined in the abstract, but shall take account of both the
degree of risk faced and any particular vulnerabilities of the applicant for asylum
5.06 Persecution may take the form of administrative and/or judicial measures which either have the
appearance of legality and are misused for the purposes of persecution, or are carried out in breach of the
law.
5.07 General measures to safeguard public order, State security, or public health will not usually amount to
persecution, so long as they meet the requirements for valid limitation of or derogation from human rights
obligations established by international law.
5.08 Criminal prosecution or punishment for breach of an ordinary law of general application will not
usually amount to persecution. It may be otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages in
discriminatory prosecution or adjudication; if it imposes discriminatory punishment; or if its law purports
to criminalize the exercise of a basic international human right or to require an individual to commit acts
which are in violation of basic norms of international law.
5 .09 Prosecution or punishment for refusal to meet a general obligation to perform military service
(whether for conscientious objection, absence without leave, evasion, or desertion) will not usually amount
to persecution. It may be otherwise, however, if the State of origin engages in discriminatory conscription;
assigns duties or conditions of service on a discriminatory basis; imposes sanctions for failure to meet
military service obligations on a discriminatory basis; seeks to require participation in military activities in
breach of international law; or fails to provide a reasonable and non-discriminatory alternative to military
service for persons with genuine political, religious, or moral convictions to military service.
5 .10 Persecution may arise from a combination of circumstances which would not amount to persecution if
considered separately.

6. " ... [Flor reasons of race, religion. nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion ... "
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6.01 Not every person who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted is a refugee. Unless the risk faced
by the applicant can be linked to at least one of the five grounds enumerated in the Convention - race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion - the claim to asylum is
not established.
6.02 It is not sufficient that an applicant is a person defined by a Convention ground and also has a wellfounded fear of being persecuted. There must be a causal connection between these two elements of the
definition.
6.03 The causal connection required is between a Convention ground and the applicant's well-founded fear
of "being persecuted." Because it is the asylum-seeker's predicament which must be based on a
Convention ground, the duty to show a causal connection is met when either the threat of harm or the
withholding of effective state protection is based on a Convention ground.
6.04 A fear of being persecuted is for reasons of a Convention ground whether it is experienced as an
individual, or as part of a group.
6.05 The "for reasons of' requirement does not require the applicant for asylum or the group of which he
or she is a part to be more at risk than other persons or groups in the country of origin.
6.06 The Convention ground need not account for the entirety of the risk of being persecuted, nor even be
its primary cause. It must, however, be an appreciable explanatory factor.
6.07 The requisite causal connection between the applicant's predicament and a Convention ground may
be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
6.08 Asylum seekers who come from a country in which many or all persons face the risk of generalized
oppression or violence are nonetheless entitled to be recognized as refugees if their race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion accounts for an appreciable part
of their well-founded fear of being persecuted.
6.09 Persons in flight from civil war or internal or generalized armed conflict are not necessarily
Convention refugees, but neither are they automatically excluded from refugee status. A well-founded fear
of being persecuted may arise in a situation of war, particularly where war or violence is a means of
carrying out a persecutory policy against one or more groups defined by race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; or where the State withholds its protection
from an individual or group for a Convention reason.
6.10 It is not the duty of the applicant accurately to identify the reason he or she has a well-founded fear of
being persecuted. The State determining the claim to asylum shall decide which, if any, Convention ground
is causally connected to the applicant's predicament.
6.11 The various Convention grounds frequently overlap. It is immaterial whether the well-founded fear
of being persecuted arises from any single one of these grounds or from a combination of two or more of
them. It may also be the case that the risk of being persecuted arises only when two or more Convention
grounds combine in the same person, in which case the combination of such grounds is the basis for the
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well-founded fear of being persecuted.
6.12 The fact that the grounds are genuine or simply attributed to the applicant by the State or nongovernmental agent of persecution is immaterial.
6.13 An individual shall not be expected to deny his or her identity or beliefs in order to avoid coming to
the attention of the State or non-governmental agent of persecution.
6.14 Care shall be taken not to confuse the reason an applicant for asylum has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted with the form which that persecution may take. In particular, a woman or girl may face the risk
of a gender-specific form of persecution on the grounds of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion,
or membership of a particular social group.
6.15 "Race" includes colour, descent, and national or ethnic origin.
6.16 "Religion" includes the holding of, or failure to hold, any belief. It also includes participation in, or
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other
religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by
any religious belief.
6. I 7 ''Nationality" includes citizenship or the lack thereof, as well as membership of a group defined by its
cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, common geographical or political origins, or its relationship with the
population of another State.
6.18 "Political opinion" includes an opinion on a matter on which the machinery of state, government, or
policy may be engaged, whether or not that opinion has been acted upon by the applicant.
6.19 "Membership of a particular social group" is an open-ended concept which comprises affiliation with
any group comprised of persons who share a common characteristic which is fundamental to identity or
conscience.

7. " ... [A]nd is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it."
7 .0 I Refugee status shall be recognized only in the case of a person who is either unable or legitimately
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the country of origin's protection against the significant risk of being
persecuted.
7.02 Where it appears that the risk of being persecuted is clearly confined to a specific part of the territory
of the country of origin, the requirement that a refugee be " ... unable or, owing to such fear ( of being
persecuted), is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" authorizes an inquiry to
determine whether the person concerned can find effective State protection in another part of his or her own
country, to which he or she may reasonably be returned.
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7.03 The relevant inquiry is not whether an applicant might have avoided departure from her or his
country of origin. Nor is it an assessment of whether the risk of being persecuted can presently be avoided
somewhere inside the asylum seeker's country of origin.
7.04 Analysis shall be directed to the identification of asylum seekers who do not require international
protection because they can presently access meaningful protection of their country in a part of that
country's territory.
7.05 Consideration of the possibility of denying refugee status on internal protection grounds shall take
place only once it is determined that the applicant otherwise has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
a Convention reason.
7 .06 The State determining the claim to asylum shall in all cases establish a prima facie case that a
particular region of the country of origin meets the internal protection criteria set out below. Once such a
case has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for asylum to demonstrate why the criteria
are not satisfied.
7. 07 First, a present possibility of meaningful protection inside the State of origin exists only if the
applicant can be returned to the internal region adjudged to satisfy the criteria for internal protection.
7 .08 Second, there must be no significant risk that the agent of persecution will be present in the designated
place of internal protection in the foreseeable future. Because a national government is presumed to be
entitled to act throughout the whole of the national territory, there is a strong presumption against finding
internal protection to be available if the agent of persecution is, or is sponsored by, the national
government.
7.09 Third, there must be no well-founded fear of being persecuted by reason ofreturn to the proposed site
of internal protection.
7.10 Fourth, because the denial ofrefugee status is predicated not simply on the absence of a risk of being
persecuted, but more fundamentally on the availability of internal protection, there must be evidence that
the applicant's own State can and will provide meaningful protection to him or her in the proposed site of
internal protection.

8. "This Convention shall cease to apply to any person if..."
8.01 Once a person's status as a refugee has been determined, it is maintained until and unless he or she
comes within the terms of one of the cessation clauses in Art. l(C) of the Refugee Convention.
8.02 In principle, application of the cessation clauses is declaratory, acknowledging that international
refugee protection is no longer required.
8.03 The State of asylum bears the burden of proof to establish that an individual has ceased to be a
refugee for a reason stipulated in Art. l(C). A decision to withdraw refugee status shall be based on
objective and verifiable evidence, and shall always be investigated on an individual basis. The refugee shall
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have the opportunity to contest the application of Art. l(C).

8(a) "He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country: of his nationalitY ... "
8(a).01 A refugee who voluntarily seeks and obtains from the authorities of his or her country of origin a
form of diplomatic protection available only to nationals of that country, such as the issuance or renewal of
a national passport, may thereby cease to be a refugee. For this to be so, however, the refugee must
specifically intend by the action to re-avail himself or herself of the protection of that country.
8(a).02 Where the contact between a refugee and the diplomatic mission of his or her country of origin is
incidental, it is unlikely to evince the requisite intention to secure that State's protection.
8(a).03 A refugee who seeks and obtains diplomatic protection from his or her country of origin on the
instructions of authorities of an asylum State cannot be said to have acted voluntarily.

8(b) "Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it ... "
8(b ).01 A refugee who has lost the nationality of his or her country of origin, and who voluntarily seeks
and receives again the nationality of that State, thereby ceases to be a refugee. The re-acquisition of
nationality de Jure alone is insufficient to justify application of the cessation clause. Voluntary reacquisition of former nationality must be accompanied by the actual restoration of relations between the
individual and the country of nationality.

8(c) "He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country: of his new
nationality ... "
8( c).0 I The acquisition of nationality de Jure alone is insufficient to justify application of the cessation
clause. Acquisition of nationality must be accompanied by the actual establishment of relations between
the individual and the country of nationality.
8( c).02 An individual who ceases to be a refugee by operation of this clause is not precluded from seeking
asylum anew on the grounds that he or she has a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the new country
of nationality.
8(c).03 Where refugee status has come to an end by virtue of the acquisition of a new nationality, and the
new nationality is subsequently lost, refugee status may be revived, depending on the circumstances.

8( d) "He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country: which he left or outside of which he
has remained owing to fear of persecution ... "
8(d).0l Voluntary re-establishment in the country of origin is perhaps the clearest evidence that a refugee
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does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted in that country. A refugee who returns to his or her
country of origin with a view to residing there on an ongoing basis thereby ceases to be a refugee.
8(d).02 Voluntary re-establishment shall not, however, be equated with voluntary return to the country of
origin for serious reasons on a short-term, strictly temporary basis.
8(d).03 A consistent pattern of regular return visits to the country of origin may nonetheless over time
amount to re-establishment in that country. This is particularly so if the refugee avails himself or herself of
the benefits and facilities in the country normally enjoyed by citizens.
8(d).04 A person whose right to asylum has been recognized shall retain that status for a period of at least
six months after departure from the State which recognized that status, if such departure is authorized by
the asylum State and is made for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not conditions in the country of
origin have improved sufficiently to enable the resumption of permanent residence there.

8(e) "He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he has been
recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection
of the country of his nationality ... [or in the case of a stateless refugee, he is) able to return to the
country of his former habitual residence ... "
8(e).01 Refugee status comes to an end if and when a change of circumstances in a refugee's country of
origin is of such a profound and durable nature that it eliminates the refugee's well-founded fear of being
persecuted.
8( e ).02 A profound change of circumstances is not the same as an improvement in conditions in the country
of origin. The relevant inquiry is whether there has been a fundamental change of substantial political or
social significance which has produced a stable power structure different from that under which the original
well-founded fear of being persecuted was produced.
8(e ).03 A profound change of circumstances may be said to be durable only after the State of asylum has
carefully monitored conditions in the country of origin for a reasonable period oftime.
8( e ).04 While in some cases general evidence will warrant a presumption in favour of cessation of status
for a group of similarly situated refugees, each individual refugee affected shall be afforded the
opportunity for an examination of circumstances relevant to his or her individual case.
8(e ).05 The State invoking this cessation clause shall consider an appropriate status, preserving previously
acquired rights, for persons who have compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to
re-avail themselves of the protection of their country of origin.

9. "This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from organs or
agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
protection or assistance. When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason without
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the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the
benefits of this Convention."
9.01 An individual who has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason, but who is at
present benefiting from the protection or assistance of a United Nations agency (other than that of the
UNHCR) is excluded from refugee status.
9.02 For purposes of this clause, the protection or assistance available from the United Nations agency
must have the effect of eliminating or durably suppressing the individual's well-founded fear of being
persecuted.
9.03 An individual is excluded from refugee status on grounds of United Nations protection or assistance
only if he or she has received such protection or assistance before seeking asylum, and has not at any time
ceased to receive such protection or assistance.
9.04 Exclusion under this clause shall not occur if an individual is prevented by circumstances beyond his
or her control from returning to the place in which he or she is in principle entitled to benefit from United
Nations protection or assistance.
9.05 Any person who is excluded from refugee status by operation of this clause shall automatically be
entitled to recognition as a refugee at such time as the protection or assistance afforded by the relevant
United Nations agency may for any reason cease without definitive resolution by the General Assembly of
the concerns of the protected population.

10. "This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities
of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights of the nationality of that
country."
10.01 Only an individual who has "taken residence" in a State in which he or she has no well-founded fear
of being persecuted shall be excluded under this clause. Mere transient or purely temporary presence in
such a State is not a basis for exclusion.
10.02 An individual shall be excluded only ifhe or she is effectively assimilated to the citizens of the State
ofresidence for purposes of human rights protection and, in particular, is guaranteed full protection against
deportation or expulsion.
10.03 Whatever rights an individual once enjoyed, the applicability of Art. l(E) shall be decided on the
basis of the situation existing at the date of the assessment of refugee status.

11. "The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there
are serious reasons for considering that. .. "
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11.01 To ensure that the integrity of the institution of asylum is not undermined, no person defined in Art.
l(F) of the Convention may under any circumstance be recognized as a refugee. Exclusion shall also occur
where the facts requiring exclusion become known after the recognition of refugee status.
11.02 The standard of proofrequired for exclusion is best stated as "substantially demonstrable grounds."
This implies more than mere suspicion or conjecture, yet less than proof on a balance of probabilities.
11.03 In view of the serious consequences of a decision to exclude an individual from refugee status, care
and thorough consideration of all relevant circumstances under a fair and efficient procedure is of
paramount importance.
11.04 The exclusion of one member of a family shall not lead automatically to the exclusion of any other
member of the same family.

1 l(a) " ... [H]e has committed a crime against peace, a war crime. or a crime against humanity, as
defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such crimes ... "
l l(a).01 A crime against peace consists of planning, preparing, initiating, or waging war in violation of
international law.
l l(a).02 A war crime consists of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949; any other
serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict; or in the case of an
armed conflict not of an international character, a serious violation of Art. 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949.
11 (a).03 A crime against humanity consists of any act described in Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.
l l(a).04 The personal and knowing involvement of the individual in an act described in Art. l(F)(a) is
ordinarily a requirement for exclusion from refugee status.
l l(a).05 An applicant who has committed a crime defined in Art. l(F)(a) may not invoke superior orders or
prescription by law in order to avoid exclusion from refugee status unless he or she was under a legal
obligation to obey such orders, did not know that the order was unlawful, and the order was not manifestly
unlawful. Orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful.
I l(a).06 An individual may be excluded under this clause ifhe or she was the superior of a person or group
of persons primarily responsible for the commission of a crime described in Art. l(F)(a).

I I(b) " ... [H]e has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country ofrefuge prior to
his admission to that country: as a refugee ... "
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1 l(b).01 Exclusion under Art. l(F)(b) serves two related purposes. First, it safeguards the principled right
of an asylum State to refuse to admit as a refugee any person who is a serious fugitive from justice.
Second and related, it ensures that the duty to protect refugees does not conflict with the asylum State's
extradition obligations. It follows that for purposes of exclusion under Art. 1(F)(b ), only crimes committed
outside the State in which asylum is sought are relevant. Such crimes must be justiciable, and must meet a
high definition of gravity.
l l(b).02 First, the criminal allegation must be based on acts committed outside the asylum State, whether
in the country of origin or while in transit to the State in which asylum is sought.
1 l(b).03 Second, both rationales for the exclusion clause require the criminal offence to be justiciable in
the country in which it was committed.
1 l(b).04 Third, the offence committed must be one for which the asylum State would in principle be
prepared to grant extradition.
11 (b ).05 In determining whether or not the offence is so serious that it would ordinarily lead to extradition,
any exceptions the asylum State normally applies in the consideration of extradition requests, subject to
limits set by the 1996 European Convention Relating to Extradition between the Member States and other
relevant Community norms, comprise an integral part of the standard for exclusion under Art. l(F)(b). An
assessment of whether or not an offence is "political" requires consideration of whether the ends employed
were proportionate to the ends sought to be achieved, taking the particular context into account.
11 (b ).06 Concern that a particular asylum seeker poses a threat to the safety or security of an asylum state
is not grounds for exclusion under Art. l(F)(b). Refugee status determination shall proceed in the usual
way in such cases, with concerns of safety and security addressed pursuant to Art. 33(2).

1 l(c) " ... [H]e has been guilty of acts contrary to the pw.:poses and principles of the United
Nations."
1l(c).01 The principles and purposes of the United Nations are expressly defined in the United Nations
Charter.
11 (c ).02 In addition, where a widely accepted international agreement declares that the commission of
certain acts is contrary to the principles and purposes of the UN, then there is a strong indication that those
acts will fall within Art. l(F)(c).
11 ( c).03 Article 1(F)(c) is directed notably at persons in senior positions in a State or international
organization who, by virtue of their responsibilities, have ordered or lent their authority to action at
variance with those purposes and principles, as well as to the members of security forces who assumed
personal responsibility for the performance of such action.
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